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Abstract
Small business leaders face a wide range of cybersecurity threats. Ransomware is a
specific cybersecurity threat that cybercriminals can use to deny small business leaders’
access to data in exchange for a ransom payment. Grounded in routine activity conceptual
framework, the purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore effective
strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware. Data were collected from 5
leaders of small businesses in the southeast region of the United States. Data sources
included interviews and archival documents. Data were analyzed using Yin’s 5 step
process. The analysis revealed 3 primary themes: ransomware strategy, support structure,
and cybersecurity awareness. Managers and leaders of small businesses could potentially
benefit from this research by applying strategies that emerged from the identified themes
to prevent victimization from ransomware. The implications for positive social change
include the potential to support the local economy and to prevent and mitigate the spread
of ransomware to protect confidential and sensitive consumer information.
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study
Small business leaders who rely on information systems as a critical component
of their business face a spectrum of cybersecurity threats. The cybersecurity threat of
ransomware denies small businesses access to their data in exchange for a ransom
payment. The threat of ransomware attacks continues to escalate through computer
vulnerabilities while criminal business models become more sophisticated (Young &
Yung, 2017). The foundation of this study is the challenges faced by leaders of small
businesses in protecting their information systems from the escalating use of ransomware.
Background of the Problem
The background of the problem consists of a specific type of cybersecurity threat
to business. Ransomware is a type of cybersecurity threat that, once activated, prevents
legitimate users from accessing their information systems until they pay a ransom
(Brown, 2016). The criminal actors involved demand a ransom in return for access to
business data (Choudhary, Zavarsky, & Lindskog, 2016). Victims typically pay ransoms
with a difficult-to-trace electronic cryptocurrency (Brown, 2016). Complaints regarding
infections from ransomware continue to rise (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016;
Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2016). The success rate of infection is evidence that
security models to protect against ransomware are inadequate. Reactive security models
fail to provide adequate protection from the threat of cryptoviral ransomware extortion
attacks (Young & Yung, 2017). Inadequate planning, preparation, and training for
addressing ransomware can cause a small business to encounter operational disruptions,
affecting business continuity and causing reputational damage. Small businesses may
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benefit from knowledge and strategies to protect their information systems from
ransomware. I have provided the background to the problem, and the focus of the study.
In the following paragraphs, I discuss the problem statement, purpose statement, nature
of the study, research questions, interview questions, conceptual framework, operational
definitions, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations, and the significance of the study.
Finally, I provide a review of the professional and academic literature.
Problem Statement
Ransomware has become a significant cybersecurity threat to business
(Choudhary et al., 2016). Globally, new cases of ransomware infection grew to a rate of
over 100,000 daily during the first few months of 2016 (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2016), with over $2.4 million in losses and 2,673 total complaints for 2016 in the United
States (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2016). The general business problem is that
many small business cybersecurity resources fail to protect information systems. The
specific business problem is that some small business leaders lack the cybersecurity
strategies necessary to protect their information systems from ransomware.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the
cybersecurity strategies some small business leaders use to protect their information
systems from ransomware. The targeted population for this study was five small business
leaders located in the Knox County region of Tennessee who successfully implemented
cybersecurity strategies to protect their information systems from ransomware. The
study’s implications for positive social change include the potential for increasing
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employment opportunities in the region and supporting the local economy by protecting
information systems from ransomware. Furthermore, small business leaders may realize
their value as a cybercrime target and consider implementing stronger cybersecurity
controls to prevent and mitigate the spread of ransomware to protect confidential and
sensitive consumer information.
Nature of the Study
I used a qualitative method to explore strategies that small business leaders use to
protect their information systems from ransomware. Researchers espouse using the
qualitative method to observe, understand, and explore a phenomenon (Goldberg &
Allen, 2015). Researchers in quantitative research attempt to answer a question by using
numbers for quantifying, measuring, and comparing the data (McCusker & Gunaydin,
2015). Mixed method research is relevant when the goal of the researcher is to combine
the use of quantitative and qualitative methods (Abro, Khurshid, & Aamir, 2015). The
quantitative and mixed method approaches are not appropriate because my objective was
to explore the business problem qualitatively and not to conduct a quantitative analysis.
I used a case study design to explore viewpoints about the cybersecurity strategies
of small business leaders. Case study design is appropriate in business settings where
there is a potential benefit from gathering viewpoints from different perspectives and
analyzing participants’ experience with phenomena (Turner & Danks, 2014). A purpose
of phenomenological design is to explore the meanings of participants’ lived experiences
(Wilson, 2015). The phenomenological research design was not appropriate for this study
because exploring the meanings of lived experiences does not allow for a focused
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examination of the business problem. In ethnographic research, the researcher must
explore the culture of participants to become part of the social environment (Gelling,
2014). An ethnographic research design was not appropriate, as becoming immersed in
the culture was outside the scope of this study. In narrative research, the objective is to
understand lived experiences using others’ words or descriptions (Joyce, 2015). Narrative
research may offer a much wider description of events and behaviors than needed.
Because I intended to explore strategies for mitigating ransomware from multiple data
sources, I used a multiple case study design rather than other qualitative designs.
Research Question
What cybersecurity strategies do some small business leaders use to protect their
information systems from ransomware?
Interview Questions
1. What strategies do you use to protect your information systems from
ransomware?
2. How did you assess the effectiveness of your strategies for protecting your
information systems from ransomware?
3. What were the key barriers to implementing the strategies for protecting your
company from ransomware?
4. How did you address the key barriers to implementing the strategies for
improving your protection against ransomware?
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5. What other information could you add that might be applicable to the strategies
that small business owners use to protect their information systems from
ransomware?
Conceptual Framework
Cohen and Felson (1979) developed the routine activity theory to explain crime as
an event that occurs in space and time. Routine activity theory was applicable to my
study, as small business leaders may use routine activity theory as a framework to
understand how effective protection against ransomware can prevent infection. Routine
activity theory is a well-established criminological theory that serves as the basis for
examining cybercrime offenses and victimization (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). I used routine
activity theory as the foundation of my conceptual framework because it related to
developing prevention strategies to address victims and attackers in the cybersecurity
realm against ransomware. The following key constructs underlie routine activity theory:
(a) potential offender, (b) target, and (c) absence of protection (Cohen & Felson, 1979).
Applying the conceptual framework led to an understanding of the findings from this
study because ransomware requires an actor as the ransomware offender, a target for the
ransomware payload, and a lack of protection against the payload for the ransomware to
cause damage. Adequate protection prevents a bad actor from compromising a robust
system. The absence of adequate protection enables perpetrators to compromise a
previously clean information system with a ransomware payload. The conceptual
framework served as an appropriate lens to understand managerial actions to protect
against cyberattacks.
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Operational Definitions
The following includes definitions of terms used throughout this study.
Bitcoin: Bitcoin, created in 2009, is a pseudo-anonymous cryptographic electronic
currency (Ortolani, 2016).
Blockchain: The blockchain is a public ledger containing the pseudo-anonymous
Bitcoin addresses with every associated Bitcoin transaction (Ortolani, 2016).
Capable guardianship: Capable guardianship consists of technical capable
guardianship (an example is antivirus software) and personal capable guardianship (a
person with high technical knowledge and capable of anticipating threats thereby
reducing target accessibility; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016).
Cryptovirology: Researchers from Columbia University coined the term
cryptovirology to describe the study of offensive cryptoviral technology consisting of
malware and cryptography (Young & Yung, 2017).
Guardianship: Guardianship is synonymous with protection, while researchers
commonly expand the definition to include other elements such as surveillance and the
role of surveillance in preventing crime (Vries & Gelder, 2015).
Ransomware: Ransomware is a form of cryptovirology used to extort money from
victims (Young & Yung, 2017).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
Assumptions are commonly accepted as fact without any proof and made by
researchers during study design, data capture, and interpretation of results (Niven &
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Boorman, 2016). The first assumption for this study was that participants would have an
interest and be willing to participate in the study. Another assumption was that
participants would provide honest and truthful responses to interview questions. An
additional assumption was that conducting face-to-face interviews and acquiring
company documents would provide the information needed for thematic development.
Another assumption was that responses provided by the participants would be substantial
and address the research question. To mitigate these assumptions, I purposely selected
participants, established positive relationships, and conducted interviews that lead to data
saturation.
Limitations
Researchers define limitations of a study to account for known weaknesses and to
provide transparency (Levy, Fabian, & Peters, 2015). One limitation was the continual
evolution of ransomware and how effective strategies change over time. The
effectiveness of ransomware improves as attackers create more sophisticated ransomware
and exploit new vulnerabilities (Genç, Lenzini, & Ryan, 2017; Kharraz, Robertson,
Balzarotti, Bilge, & Kirda, 2015). Another limitation was related to my constrained
sample size, as small samples may not provide significant findings to transfer to other
venues or businesses with strategies for coping with ransomware. Data saturation within
qualitative research requires at least two case studies to justify the sample size for
transferability with small samples (Boddy, 2016). An additional limitation was that the
chosen participants consisted of small business leaders who may have lacked a priori
knowledge required to answer the interview questions from the standpoint of an
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information technology expert. It is possible for researchers to mitigate inherent
limitations in case study research by combining research synthesis techniques (Levy et
al., 2015).
Delimitations
Study delimitations consist of parameters, scope, and boundaries (HernándezFlores et al., 2017). One delimitation of this study was chosen participants were small
business leaders rather than information technology experts. Another delimitation of the
study was the sample size of five small business leaders. An additional delimitation of the
study was the geographic region of the study—the Knox County region of Tennessee.
Significance of the Study
The significance of this study is that small business leaders may become more
informed about the implications of weak cybersecurity controls for compromising
business operations. Small business leaders remain uninformed of the magnitude of the
threat posed by ransomware (Fanning, 2015; Paulsen, 2016). Small business leaders may
learn how to mitigate and strengthen their cybersecurity to lessen negative consequences
stemming from ransomware attacks. Small business leaders might also gain the
information they need to promote safety and stability in their locus of control,
profitability, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness in responsibly managing cybersecurity
risks associated with ransomware. Businesses leaders of larger firms with more
sophisticated information systems than a small business might find it useful to adapt the
strategies used by some small business leaders as mitigation strategies to combat
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ransomware targeting small business information systems to subcomponents of larger and
more complex information systems.
Contribution to Business Practice
The potential significance of this study to the practice of business is multifaceted.
Small business leaders may have the opportunity to learn about securing their information
systems from ransomware attacks. A strategic ransomware cybersecurity plan includes
scenarios for the potential attack, steps taken during the attack, the post ransomware
incident response, and defensive posturing (Bridget, 2016). Findings from this study may
contribute to avoiding or mitigating the effects of ransomware and hardening existing
information systems, as well as provide a foundation to create a strategic cybersecurity
plan that may enable small business owners to address the threats from ransomware.
Implications for Social Change
The implications of this study to social change include increased public awareness
about the transformative power of cybersecurity technologies and strengthened trust in
universal cybernetworks. The potential adoption of a stronger security posture may
support the protection of sensitive consumer information, while assurance promotes
consumer trust in Internet commerce. Advancements in cybersecurity support the
distribution of innovative technologies, which is a societal benefit (Yeoh, 2017). Also,
positive social change might result from employment opportunities and effects on local
economies by mitigating potential economic losses to small businesses originating from a
ransomware infection.
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A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the
cybersecurity strategies that small business leaders use to protect their information
systems from ransomware. The purpose of this professional and academic literature
review was to compare and contrast opposing positions and complementary research
surrounding my research topic. The literature review begins with an expository of the
applied conceptual framework of routine activity theory.
My sources for the literature review included journals available from academic
databases, such as the Academic Search Complete/Premier, DeepDyve, EBSCOhost,
Google Scholar, NASA’s Astrophysics Data System Bibliographic Services, ProQuest,
and SAGE. I accessed these electronic databases through the Walden University Library.
I kept a research journal to document specific keywords for searching these databases and
subscribed to peer-reviewed journals to track the latest research and trends related to my
topic. Specific keywords include 1979 routine activity theory, Cohen and Felson,
ransomware and business, routine activities, routine activity theory, routine activity
theory and cybercrime, and a combination of routine activity theory and cybercrime and
ransomware. In order to assist thematic development, I created an application to track
references, store annotated bibliographies, and generate thematic mind maps based on
keyword density.
The review includes 69 resources, 94% of which were peer-reviewed and verified
using Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory. Ninety-seven percent had publication dates from
2014 to 2018. I organized the literature review with the routine activity theory framework
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first, followed by routine activity theory conceptual constructs, the study of ransomware,
ransomware and routine activity theory constructs, theory comparisons, cybersecurity,
strategic management and ransomware cybersecurity, ransomware and business,
operationalizing routine activity theory constructs, and a summary.
Routine Activity Theory
Routine activity theory existed prior to the notion of cybercrime. Cohen and
Felson (1979) developed routine activity theory to analyze crime without relying on
offender information. Researchers use this theory to highlight the role of criminal spatial
decision making on offender familiarity and ease of access, which in turn serves to
increase preferential selection based on proximity and the likelihood of getting caught
(Frith, Johnson, & Fry, 2017). The anti-spatial nature of cyberspace is in direct conflict
with routine activity theory studies because routine activity theory relies on spatial
properties of the physical environment (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). The suitability of routine
activity theory for examining cybercrime in the antispatial cyberrealm is not immediately
evident.
A precedent does exist, however, for using routine activity theory in cyberspace
with a major strength of overcoming the challenges inherent in gaining access to
offenders in the online environment by removing the requirement of the physical
environment. Regardless of the lack of identified spatial features in cyberspace, routine
activity theory is suitable for the study of online victimization and high-technology
malware-related crimes (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Routine activity theory is flexible
enough to accommodate abstract concepts regarding space and time from the physical
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world to the virtual. For example, researchers utilize routine activity theory to study
victimization in the antispatial realm of cybercrime. Paek and Nalla (2015) used routine
activity theory to find a positive relationship with routine online activities and online
victimization, and Brady, Randa, and Reyns (2016) used routine activity theory to
explore financial cybercrime and found that a significant number of businesses
experience cybercrime on a regular basis. Ilievski (2016) conducted a study using routine
activity theory to determine that users who spend more time online put themselves at
greater risk of becoming a victim of cybercrime. Chen, Beaudoin, and Hong (2017) used
routine activity theory to study victimization in the cyberrealm and found careless
cybersecurity behavior persists until after victimization occurs.
Researchers also use routine activity theory to overcome challenges inherent with
studying cybercrime. Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) tested the use of routine activity theory
and cybercrime to determine awareness and training are the most crucial elements for
safely banking online, but no determination of the effectiveness of guardianship occurred.
Choi and Lee (2017) concluded that routine activity theory is inadequate for explaining
the role of guardianship in cyberinterpersonal violence victimization, and the most
effective way to mitigate online threats is to use personal digital guardianship and enduser education on the dangers associated with the Internet. However, Holt, Burruss, and
Bossler (2016) found that, despite criticism of the effectiveness of routine activity theory
in cybercrime research, the framework is sufficient for exploring cybercrime
victimization and for providing target-hardening strategies to combat criminal actors who
introduce thousands of new malware variants on a daily basis. Leukfeldt and Yar (2016)
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overcame challenges associated with routine activity theory and testing online
victimization and high-technology malware-related crimes by using interviews.
Routine activity theory is well suited for the study of victimization and
guardianship from malware. However, the study of cybersecurity using routine activity
theory extends beyond topics related to malware. Routine activity theory was suitable for
developing an understanding of the characteristics of cybervictim targets in phishing
scams designed to steal money from victims’ bank accounts (Leukfeldt, 2014). One
example of a phishing scam involves an attacker sending a fraudulent e-mail to a
potential victim to lure the victim to click on a link or to divulge personal information to
the attacker (Leukfeldt, 2014). The constructs of routine activity theory encompass a
potential victim, a motivated attacker, and a lack of capable guardianship (Cohen &
Felson, 1979). In the phishing scam example, the potential victim is the user who might
click on the fraudulent link in the e-mail, the motivated attacker is the responsible party
sending the offending e-mail, and the lack of capable guardianship could be the lack of
protective software or the lack of user knowledge to differentiate between a legitimate
link in an e-mail and a fraudulent link in an email. The three constructs of routine activity
theory fulfill the prerequisites of crime.
Researchers may not know or have defined the lack of a capable guardian in the
context of cybercrime. The capable guardian or protective factor component of routine
activity theory, varies based on the type of cybercrime. The protective factor of antivirus
software is applicable when the focus is on malware attacks; however, antivirus software
fails to provide adequate protection against phishing scams (Leukfeldt, 2014). In cases of
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phishing victimization, the capable guardianship or protective element of routine activity
theory shifts responsibility to the leadership of financial institutions who coordinate
financial transactions on behalf of the consumer (Leukfeldt, 2014). The definition of
capable guardianship is flexible enough to define protection elements present in a small
business information system.
Small business information systems contain elements exposed to the public
Internet. Routine activity theory applied to research involving phishing, hacking, and
malware allows researchers to consider the increased potential for victimization based on
online activity and target suitability (Reyns, 2015). Offending and victimization related to
malware can begin with successful phishing or hacking attacks (Reyns, 2015).
Researchers have called for additional research related to identifying correlates for online
victimization (Reyns, 2015). Prior research serves as an empirical foundation of the
suitability and usefulness of routine activity theory for studying cybercrime (Brady et al.,
2016; Chen et al., 2017; Choi & Lee, 2017; Holt et al., 2016; Ilievski, 2016; Jansen &
Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Paek & Nalla, 2015). Over time, the use of
routine activity theory evolved to incorporate and explain routine activity phenomena
existing in the online realm rather than as originally intended in the physical realm.
Spatial. Routine activity theory in the spatial context adheres to the original
intention of explaining how and why crimes occur in the physical realm. It is possible for
potential victims to design the physical environment to deter potential offenders from
criminal behavior (Blasdell, 2015). According to researchers, removing a single element
of routine activity theory is enough to prevent a crime from occurring (Blasdell, 2015;
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Mui & Mailley, 2015). In the absence of capable guardianship or the lack of oversight
from management in the physical workplace, perpetration of the crime occurs once a
suitable target and a motivated offender make contact (Mui & Mailley, 2015).
Researchers use routine activity theory to predict physical and property victimization in
the workplace (Kodellas, Fisher, & Wilcox, 2015). The goal of preventing a crime from
occurring through the lens of routine activity theory includes the reliance on removing
one of the key tenets of the theory.
In the spatial realm, it is possible to define the influencing constructs of routine
activity theory in preventing criminal behavior. Lack of surveillance or guardianship, the
presence of motivated offenders, and the availability of suitable targets dictate the
probability and occurrence of crime (Vries & Gelder, 2015). In routine activity theory the
overlap between a motivated offender, susceptible target, and absence of capable
guardianship results in victimization (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). Parental supervision in
the form of physical guardianship and the use of antivirus software and other virtual
forms of guardianship are effective in reducing cybervictimization (Kalia & Aleem,
2017). Therefore, it is possible to extend routine activity theory to account for
victimization in antispatial realms and constructs.
Antispatial. The antispatial context of routine activity theory expands upon the
original intentions of explaining how and why crimes occur in the physical realm and
includes the immediate or eventual convergence of the offender and victim in a virtual
realm. Routine activity theory is an effective framework for studying cybervictimization
(Kalia & Aleem, 2017; Näsi, Räsänen, Kaakinen, Keipi, & Oksanen, 2017; Reyns,
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Henson, & Fisher, 2016). Perpetual online exposure of potential targets to motivated
offenders amplifies the threat of cybervictimization (Brady et al., 2016). A major
challenge in routine activity theory and cybervictimization is identifying the parallels
between motivated offenders and potential targets (Holt et al., 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar,
2016). The digital nature of cybercrime exceeds the physical precepts initially introduced
in routine activity theory and is why some researchers refute the use of routine activity
theory in cybercrime research (Holt et al., 2016). Victimization in routine activity theory
is a result of criminal opportunity and quantifying criminal opportunity in the antispatial
realm is problematic (Brady et al., 2016). Regardless of the difficulties in quantifying
criminal opportunity, it is possible to find relationships between opportunity and
cybervictimization.
Limitations on accurately reporting cybervictimization reinforce the need for
exploring alternative methods to identify victimization correlates. Researchers use routine
activity theory to remove the victim from the equation to determine the likelihood of a
crime occurring (Wick et al., 2017). Researchers sometimes use routine activity theory in
a polemic manner toward victim behavior (Arntfield, 2015). However, it remains unclear
if the use of routine activity theory is effective in the study of cybercrime (Leukfeldt &
Yar, 2016). Other researchers have found a positive relationship between routine online
activities and online victimization (Paek & Nalla, 2015). Fraud and deceit often
accompany criminal behavior in cyberspace (Agustina, 2015), and the effective use of
routine activity theory in the cyberrealm requires an understanding of how, when, and
where guardianship occurs within the context of the study (Reyns et al., 2016).
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Identifying the guardianship elements of cybercrime is an alternative method of
identifying the victimization correlates and overcoming the reporting limitations.
Study alignment. Routine activity theory depicts the key constructs suitable for
studying cybersecurity strategies relevant to the role of small business leadership in
protecting business assets from the threat of ransomware. Precedence exists for extending
the fundamental principles of routine activity theory into the antispatial realm. Empirical
evidence indicates varying levels of the suitability of routine activity theory constructs
and its applicability in the study of cybercrime victimization (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016).
Nonetheless, the conceptual constructs facilitate an examination of guardianship,
motivated offenders, and target suitability in cybercrime victimization.
Routine Activity Theory Conceptual Constructs
Conceptual constructs are useful in identifying the boundaries of data. Routine
activity theory consists of three conceptual constructs: (a) guardianship, (b) suitable
targets, and (c) motivated offenders (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). In the following sections, I
discuss these three conceptual constructs as they apply to routine activity theory and the
study of ransomware and cybersecurity.
Guardianship. The effectiveness of applied guardianship differs depending on
the environment. The effectiveness of guardianship varies depending on the applicability
of guardianship to the phenomenon under study (Wang, Gupta, & Rao, 2015). As
technology evolves, researchers continue to explore tools that provide better guardianship
to reduce and limit situational crime exposure (Brady et al., 2016). Researchers have
determined through using routine activity theory the significant role of guardianship in
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target suitability (Näsi, Oksanen, Keipi, & Räsänen, 2015). Guardianship is an evolving
and moving target with direct implications for target suitability.
Suitable targets. A suitable target is a prerequisite for cybervictimization to
occur. Storing credit card information puts customers at perpetual risk of victimization
(Brady et al., 2016). Target suitability includes an assumption of different dimensions
based on the type of crime with a direct influence on victimization risk (Reyns & Henson,
2016). A challenge for researchers without economic indicators of target attractiveness is
the lack of documented measures to gauge target suitability (Reyns & Henson, 2016).
Researchers using routine activity theory rely on valid indicators for unambiguous
research (Wolfe, Marcum, Higgins, & Ricketts, 2016). Properly correlating victimization
requires the identification of applicable indicators. Researchers select indicators and use
suitable target constructs to identify target accessibility.
Researchers identify the qualities of suitable targets to determine accessibility.
The acronym VIVA represents value, inertia, visibility, and access to describe accessible
targets (Nikitkov, Stone, & Miller, 2014). Motivated offenders’ attractions to potential
victim characteristics develop from VIVA attributes (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). The
elements of VIVA correlate to target suitability, with value as the most prominent
predictable attribute (Wang et al., 2015). Properly understanding what makes a target
suitable is relevant to understanding what motivates an offender and how victimization
occurs.
Value. The value of a target indicates the financial characteristics perceived as
desirable by an attacker (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). The original definition of value in
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routine activity theory referred to physical goods with an identifiable monetary value
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). In the online context, value refers to the monetary value of
information assets or the digital representation of physical goods to facilitate exchange in
the spatial realm (Wang et al., 2015). The value of regaining access to maliciously
encrypted information assets represents the value component of a suitable ransomware
target.
Inertia. Researchers commonly attribute inertia to a physical characteristic of an
object. The inertia of a target is more difficult to quantify in the digital realm than in the
physical (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) omitted inertia from their
cybercrime study for lack of correlation. Justifying the measurement of inertia of
potential targets in cyberspace is difficult (Nikitkov et al., 2014). Nevertheless, a
potential measurement of inertia for a ransomware target is the amount of target data the
attacker will maliciously encrypt.
Visibility. Visibility is necessary for target accessibility. The visibility of a target
indicates target suitability (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Wang et al., 2015). In an online
environment, visibility exists as online activities and behaviors (Jansen & Leukfeldt,
2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Visibility depends on knowledge of where the target
exists (Wang et al., 2015). The visibility of information assets connected to the Internet
indicates potential targets.
Access. Access refers to the accessibility of a target in a physical or virtual realm
(Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). In an online context, digital system weaknesses increase
accessibility (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). Ease of access increases target suitability
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(Nikitkov et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). Therefore, an information asset connected to
the Internet features increased accessibility to offenders probing for weaknesses.
Motivated offenders. In the online environment, many motivated offenders exist.
The presence of potential offenders in an online environment is enough to satisfy the
requirements for motivated offenders in routine activity theory (Näsi et al., 2017).
Routine activity theory does not require researchers to understand why motivated
offenders choose to offend (Wang et al., 2015). Other frameworks exist to explain why
motivated offenders choose to offend beyond just their existence. At the most
fundamental level, cybersecurity research involving the Internet meets the existence
requirement of the motivated offenders construct.
Competing Theories
Theorists are not bound to routine activity theory to address the multifaceted
issues surrounding cybersecurity. Competing victimology theories include a focus on
victim behavior to understand how and why crimes occur. In the past, theorists
incorporated victim behavior by including routine activity theory with an additional
theory or framework.
Examples of competing victimology theories include routine activity theory in
combination with another theory. One example included routine activity theory in
conjunction with lifestyle theory. In lifestyle theory, researchers take victim behavior into
account to build the probability of becoming a victim (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016).
Researchers build victim profiles using lifestyle theory to formulate risk (Agustina,
2015). Combining routine activity theory with lifestyle theory extends the ability of the
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researcher to consider victim behavior to understand the role of the victim in a criminal
event. Cybersecurity theorists can more narrowly define the lifestyle portion of the theory
to include behaviors only found in cyberspace.
In the study of victimization occurring in the antispatial realm of cyberspace,
victimology theories contain tools researchers can use to account for specific behaviors
exhibited by victims that may result in victimization. In cyberroutine activity theory,
researchers decide which online behaviors to examine to assist in determining the risk of
online victimization in probabilistic terms (Choi & Lee, 2017). An example of an online
behavior that increases the likelihood of victimization is remote risky purchasing where
the victim conducts an online transaction with a previously unknown online business and
becomes a victim of identity theft (Holtfreter, Reisig, Pratt, & Holtfreter, 2015). A
commonality among integrated routine activity theories is partial blame attribution to the
victim.
Researchers also consider demographics in other competing integrated theories.
The measurable variables of gender, race, and social class as a theoretical model in
combination with routine activity theory provide researchers with insight into how
oppressive factors influence victimization (Blasdell, 2015). Demographic factors are
outside the locus of control of participants and provide a measurable variable for
research.
Researchers can use an integrated routine activity theory framework to find
indicators rather than measurable variables. An integrated routine activity theory using
protection motivation theory provides indicators of how victims fail to protect themselves
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properly from online victimization (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). In a multiple integrated
approach using routine activity theory, negative affectivity, and low self-control theory,
lack of victim self-control did not play a role in indicating victimization (Kodellas et al.,
2015). Chen et al. (2017) integrated the extended process model, self-control theory, and
routine activity theory to determine aspects of individuals who become Internet scam
victims and found that individuals who adequately protected themselves mediated the
potential of additional online criminological risk. Researchers have demonstrated the use
of an integrated self-control and lifestyle-routine activity theory to suggest an effective
strategy in preventing cybercrime (Ilievski, 2016). Researchers can combine theoretical
frameworks to use different viewpoints, constructs, and indicators to understand
cybercrime and suggest preventive measures.
Potential rivals to routine activity theory exist as combined frameworks. Mui and
Mailley (2015) were the first researchers to combine routine activity theory with the
fraud triangle to research a fraud event. Cressey (1953) developed a primitive version of
the fraud triangle to explain the conditions necessary for embezzlement and trust
violation to occur. A comprehensive examination of a fraud event is possible when
combining the perpetrator-centric focus of the fraud triangle and environment variables
of routine activity theory (Mui & Mailley, 2015). Decoupling routine activity theory from
the fraud triangle narrows the focus to the perpetrator and diminishes the usefulness of
fraud triangle for studying ransomware when access to the perpetrator is limited or
nonexistent.
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Fraud. Fraud is one component of the broader topic of crime. A perpetrator can
commit a crime by force, deceit, or imprudence (Agustina, 2015). In classical
criminological research, fraud refers to crime against assets rather than an individual and
may require additional thought when investigating the same type of crime in the
cyberrealm (Agustina, 2015). It is necessary to understand how the consequences of a
crime committed in the cyberrealm intersect with the physical world for classification as
fraud (Agustina, 2015). Fraud does not occur only in the physical realm.
The fraud triangle. The fraud triangle contains a competitive model while also
remaining useful as a complement to routine activity theory. The three perpetratorfocused components of the fraud triangle in forensic accounting are perceived pressure,
opportunity, and rationalization (Omidi, Min, & Omidi, 2017; Reinstein & Taylor, 2017;
Roden, Cox, & Kim, 2016; Rodgers, Söderbom, & Guiral, 2015). Perceived pressure
involves a financial motivation (Roden et al., 2016). In the financial realm, fences serve
as a mechanism to limit opportunity (Reinstein & Taylor, 2017). Reducing perpetrators’
cognitive dissonance supports rationalization through perceptions, information, judgment,
and decisions (Rodgers et al., 2015). The fraud triangle contains the components
necessary to investigate a fraud event within a corporate setting.
Studies in which researchers used the fraud triangle to investigate fraud within the
corporate setting are different in approach and findings to studies in which researchers
used routine activity theory. At the country level, it is possible to predict the incidence of
fraud based on increases or decreases in the service, industrial, and manufacturing share
of gross domestic product (Omidi et al., 2017). Researchers have found that to reduce the
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chance of fraudulent corporate behavior, it is best to avoid having a chief executive
officer and chairman of the board serving in a dual-role capacity (Roden et al., 2016).
Similarly, incentive-based compensation strategies and the presence of women and
outside directors reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud (Roden et al., 2016). Structured
fences in the corporate realm protect accounting professionals from committing fraud and
engaging in unethical behavior (Reinstein & Taylor, 2017). An embedded ethical process
design tree consisting of perception, information, judgment, and decision inside the fraud
triangle provides managers a tool set for placing controls to cope with ethical situations
effectively (Rodgers et al., 2015). Investigating ransomware from an ethical standpoint
may not be the best way to address the issue of fraud and ransomware; however, fraud is
a component of cybersecurity.
To perform a scholarly categorization of cyberfraud within the cyberrealm, I will
examine how previous researchers defined fraud within the cybercontext. One type of
cyberfraud is online auction fraud (Arntfield, 2015). In 2013, online auctions of
automobiles garnered one of the most online auction complaints (Brady et al., 2016).
Consumer cyberfraud occurs when an attacker fails to fulfill a purchase made online or
misrepresents a product or good (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Online auction deception and
cyberfraud decreased as auction cyberfraud controls improved (Nikitkov et al., 2014).
Online auction cyberfraud controls and accounting fences are similar in protecting
unwilling participants from fraud victimization.
Cyberfraud exists and is perpetrated using methods other than through online
auctions. Identity theft victimization is another type of cyberfraud perpetrated online
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(Holtfreter et al., 2015). Failing to properly protect privacy leads to increased Internet
scam victimization that results in fraud (Chen et al., 2017). Identity cyberfraud occurs
when attackers either steal or create a fake identity to commit the fraud with or without
the use of malware to intercept victim credentials (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Once an
attacker is in possession of the potential victim’s identity, it becomes easier to convince
or lure the victim into clicking malicious links or downloading malicious payloads.
Cyberfraud beyond online auctions includes other potential victims and
victimization risks. The interconnected environment of the Internet puts online retailers
and online shoppers at risk of becoming targets for cyberfraud (Brady et al., 2016).
Cybervictimization and enhanced risks result from identity cyberfraud and consumer
cyberfraud from financial crimes perpetrated by attackers communicating with victims
using e-mail, Internet auction sites, or a website (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). How victims
interact with technology can increase the risk of victimization (Nobles, 2018). Routine
behavior of using the Internet for checking e-mail, shopping, and browsing the web is
enough to become a victim of cyberfraud.
Attackers attempt regular communications to gather intelligence and further
perpetrate cybervictimization. Fraudulent e-mails designed to collect and steal
information from recipients is one way perpetrators phish for information to perpetrate
victimization (Holtfreter et al., 2015). Attackers conduct phishing scams using phone
calls, e-mails, instant messages, and text messages (Paek & Nalla, 2015). Bank fraud
phishing victims give security codes, passwords, or remote access to their personal
devices to attackers, regardless of protective measures in place, and inadvertently allow
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the transfer of money out of the victims’ bank account (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). The
act of responding to an attacker might lead to a more serious cybervictimization event
with factors that might make a potential victim more susceptible to becoming a target for
cyberfraud.
Measures exist to calculate the risk of targets becoming victims and to avoid
becoming a victim of cyberfraud. Low self-control leads to a higher risk of online
consumer cyberfraud (Ilievski, 2016). A correlation exists between low self-control with
a higher frequency of online shopping and becoming a victim of cyberfraud (Chen et al.,
2017). One way to determine a potential victims’ susceptibility to cyberfraud is by
measuring self-control. A lack of self-control might be indicated by those willing to make
risky investments; high self-control might be indicated by those with an increased
awareness and understanding of Internet privacy (Chen et al., 2017). Fraud within the
cyberrealm refers to either consumer cyberfraud or identity cyberfraud as a single facet of
an interconnected cybercriminal model, which complicates the measurement of
calculated risk.
It is possible to reduce the complications of measuring risk using routine activity
theory to limit the effects of victim behavior and remove the need to understand the
criminal actor. Routine activity theory is flexible and extensible, and it integrates with
other theoretical frameworks. The ability to extend routine activity theory into cyberspace
allows researchers to study cybercrime without blaming the victim or without having indepth knowledge of the criminal actor. A narrow focus on ransomware, which is a crime
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occurring in cyberspace, is well-suited for a study that includes the routine activity
framework as a theoretical lens of investigative inquiry.
Study of Ransomware
The study of ransomware began as a novel thought experiment that included a
proposal regarding the potentially destructive nature of two previously unrelated
disciplines. Young and Yung (2017) provided a background of over 20 years of research
into cryptovirology and cryptovirology ransomware. Young and Yung initially proved
that previously scrutinized and mocked research on cryptovirology was factual based on
the initial cooperative efforts between a former hacker and cryptographer, circa 1995, as
publicity of ransomware infections grew. Those who lack the understanding of the
sophistication, formidability, and nature of ransomware have downplayed the reality of
the threat of ransomware (Young & Yung, 2017). A lack of regard to the threat of
ransomware creates potential victims of the innovator’s dilemma by neglecting the
proactivity required in staying ahead of the threats and risks associated with ransomware
(Young & Yung, 2017). Successful cybersecurity strategies address the factors that
explain why one potential target is more likely to suffer harm and become a victim of
ransomware than another.
The mystery of how a malicious payload like ransomware presents itself can pose
a challenge to end users of technology. A lack of standardization, the increase in Internet
use, the popularity of mobile devices, and the monetization of malware help to explain
the growth of ransomware (Fanning, 2015). Increased internet usage was found to have a
positive influence on the frequency of ransomware infection (Bergmann, Dreißigacker,

28
Skarczinski, & Wollinger, 2018). Compounding the ransomware problem are curious
individuals with minimal experience who have access to freely available and distributable
malware (Fanning, 2015). Once a ransomware infection is successful, it becomes more
destructive to attempt its removal than to pay the extortion, which leaves the victim at the
mercy of the perpetrator (Young & Yung, 2017). A lack of remedial options against
ransomware creates a one-sided relationship where a significant benefit exists in
preventing the infection and taking a proactive cybersecurity stance.
Opportunities exist to improve a business’s security posture against ransomware
while also increasing awareness and improving the reactiveness against new and
emerging cybersecurity threats. Small business leaders are uniquely able to adapt to new
and emerging cybersecurity threats more efficiently than leaders of larger organizations
with more complex information systems (Paulsen, 2016). Small business leaders with a
proactive cybersecurity posture make themselves more attractive to customers concerned
about cybersecurity (Paulsen, 2016). A lack of awareness and an inadequate
cybersecurity posture is more detrimental to small businesses’ survivability than larger
firms’ survivability with regard to how a single breach might bankrupt a small business
with limited resources (Fanning, 2015). Given the high stakes involved with small
business and the permanently destructive potential of ransomware, an argument in favor
of a proactive cybersecurity approach, rather than relying on reactive measures and
reporting the crime to law enforcement after the occurrence, is the only solution to
circumvent initial loss.
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One unique characteristic of ransomware compared to other types of infections is
that the attacker demands payment for remediation. When an attacker encrypts files and
demands payment, the infection is classified as ransomware (Hampton, Baig, & Zeadally,
2018). The preferred method of payment to decrypt files encrypted by ransomware is
through the electronic currency Bitcoin (Brown, 2016). The Bitcoin transaction ledger is
freely accessible to all Bitcoin users and allows law enforcement to discover the identity
of the responsible party (Brown, 2016). The lack of a central authority and the trustless
nature of Bitcoin allow a sender to send Bitcoins to a recipient without disclosing the
identity of either party (Ortolani, 2016). Law enforcement must triangulate the
pseudonyms visible in the public ledger, also known as the blockchain, with other online
records to attempt to identify the attacker (Brown, 2016). The success rate of identifying
the criminal actor is questionable and does nothing to mitigate or reverse the damages
caused by the ransomware infection.
The complex and public nature of reported ransomware incidents emboldens
attackers and creates alarm for potential victims. Gareth (2016) opined that news
coverage of ransomware attacks, increased reliance on digital records, and increased
sophistication in ransomware increase negative effects from infection. Simms (2016)
described how ransomware is capable of residing on systems without detection for
extended periods to encrypt system backups to limit victim remediation options.
Protecting system backups are important for successfully recovering from a ransomware
infection without paying the attacker (Thomas & Galligher, 2018). Mature
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin further complicate ransomware infection and shield the
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identity of the attacker (Gareth, 2016). As publicity of ransomware increases and the
underlying technology improves, the damage potential of ransomware becomes more
severe.
The scope and destruction of ransomware are traceable. Targeted ransomware
attacks have higher damage potential with more substantial ransoms (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2016). Federal law enforcement reported ransomware infection rates are
likely a misrepresentation of the number of actual infections because many infections go
unreported (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016). Researchers at the Internet Crime
Complaint Center collect ransomware complaints and disseminates this information to
local, state, federal, and international law enforcement agencies (Internet Crime
Complaint Center, 2016). An estimated 15% of Internet crime victims in the United
States report their crimes to law enforcement (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2016).
The suggestion that ransomware is underreported indicates a challenge in understanding
the extent of damage as a result of ransomware attacks.
Damage from ransomware infection varies by ransomware strain and is not
limited to a single technology. The most destructive strain of ransomware is the
cryptoviral variant that involves encrypting files and folders to prevent the owner from
reading them (Choudhary et al., 2016; Richardson & North, 2017). The less destructive
version of ransomware is the locker variant where the information system remains
unencrypted but perpetrators place the owner behind a locked screen that prevents access
to files on the system (Choudhary et al., 2016). Ransomware has evolved beyond
computers and is also capable of infecting mobile phones (Brody, Chang, & Schoenberg,
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2018; Choudhary et al., 2016). Ransomware infection is a threat to information systems
and other devices with embedded operating systems.
Ransomware and Routine Activity Theory Constructs
The three primary routine activity theory constructs are present in the study of
ransomware and business. Themes as applied to ransomware include offenders, targets,
target value, target protection, and victim behavior. Of these constructs and themes,
offenders who obfuscate their identities might be the most difficult to identify and access
in a business environment.
Ransomware offenders. Ransomware offenders are the criminal actors who
perpetrate attacks against suitable ransomware targets. Without a motivated ransomware
offender, routine activity theory indicates there is no crime. Ransomware offenders can
either randomly choose targets or selectively choose targets to victimize.
Ransomware offenders attempt to evade discovery by law enforcement with
digital cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Digital cryptocurrency transactions are openly
exchanged and recorded in a public ledger (Ortolani, 2016). The public ledger, referenced
as a blockchain, exists in a peer-to-peer system to bypass conventional financial
institution and government regulations (Ortolani, 2016). Attackers use ransomware to
infect information systems and hold the data hostage by demanding payment in exchange
for a decryption key (Genç et al., 2017; Kharraz et al., 2015; Young & Yung, 2017).
Bitcoin supports automated scripting to facilitate electronic payment transactions
(Ortolani, 2016). Attackers can take advantage of the scripting features available in
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin to automate the entire ransomware extortion process.
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Ransomware targets. Ransomware targets are the data storage systems of
potential victims, and ransomware targets are a necessary element for crime. The online
behavior of potential ransomware victims may play a role in target suitability.
Ransomware targets consist of potential victims willing to pay extortions to criminal
actors.
Ransomware target value. Ransomware target value changes based on
selectivity factors and perceived value of the data deprived from victims. If data have no
value, then victims may not be willing to pay extortions. Depending on the value of the
data on the data storage system, potential victims may implement measures to protect the
data prior to a ransomware attack.
Ransomware target protection. Ransomware target protection consists of
protecting the underlying data storage system where the data reside. If no ransomware
target protection exists, it may decrease the difficulty for a criminal actor to comprise the
data storage system. Researchers do not know if privacy protection behaviors are
effective in mitigating a potential ransomware attack (Chen et al., 2017). Personal
capable guardianship and technical capable guardianship are not significant in cybercrime
victimization (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Target protection efforts are no longer viable after
ransomware compromises an underlying data storage system.
Theory Comparisons
Researchers routinely conduct qualitative metasynthesis studies to explore routine
activity theory to understand cybervictimization. Wang et al. (2015) operationalized
routine activity theory with survival modeling to determine that victimization risk is
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highest from individuals within an organization. Pratt and Turanovic (2016) found an
implied nonprobabilistic view of cybervictimization using routine activity theory.
Agustina (2015) researched cybervictimization in Spain to explore victim threat
mitigation strategies. Agustina operationalized protection efforts in table form to
understand that victimization risk and determined risk controls play a significant role in
preventing victimization. Leukfeldt and Yar (2016) compared study participants to
determine the applicability of the elements of routine activity theory and victimization
risk. Leukfeldt and Yar determined visibility is the most prominently observed element
with a significant influence on cybercrime victimization. Leukfeldt and Yar also revealed
no clear indication of the applicability of accessibility and personal capable guardianship
with value. Leukfeldt and Yar found technical capable guardianship was not significant.
Blasdell (2015) applied an intersectional approach using a demographic lens to determine
higher victimization risk among marginalized populations. Arntfield (2015) conducted a
meta-analysis of victimology studies using a lens of cyberbullying and routine activity
theory to theorize how the anonymous nature of cyberspace can facilitate deviant and
criminal behavior. Ilievski (2016) referenced 57 research articles, drew six main
conclusions about lifestyle routine activity theory, and found a significant link did not
exist between protective measures and victimization risk. Ilievski noted large samples
support the effectiveness of lifestyle routine activity theory over routine activity theory to
explain cybercrime and cybervictimization. Qualitative metasynthesis studies involving
routine activity theory share a common theme that includes the utility of routine activity
theory and victim risk assessment.
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Cybercrime victims are not limited to adults aged 18 and over. Wolfe et al. (2016)
conducted a telephone survey with random dialing of 800 nationally representative
adolescents aged 12 to 17 and their parents. Wolfe et al. reduced the total number of
participants to 625 teenagers with cellphones after applying eligibility criteria and found
routine activity theory effective for studying and explaining victimization in the
cyberrealm. Näsi et al. (2015) studied cybercrime victimization among young people
using a four-country sample of 3,506 teenagers and young adults from the ages of 15 to
30 with slander and threat of violence as the most observed cybervictimization. Näsi et al.
further delineated the results by demographics and used logistic regression models to test
the previous four-country sample of teenagers and young adults to determine exposure to
offenders as a significant predictor of cybercrime victimization. Kalia and Aleem (2017)
determined the differences between victims and nonvictims of 200 high school students
were target suitability and parental supervision using routine activity theory and
cybervictimization. Cybercrime researchers delimit studies using demographics as a
differentiator outside the control of participants.
Some researchers pool together participants to delimit victim behavior research
and interpret findings. Wick et al. (2017) conducted an online survey using 298
university students enrolled in introductory psychology courses in a southwestern state.
Wick et al. used an independent sample t test, correlations, and hierarchical multiple
regression analysis. Choi and Lee (2017) performed a theoretical analysis of
cyberinterpersonal violence victimization and offending using cyberroutine activity
theory. Choi and Lee determined participating in risky online leisure activity increased
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the likelihood of cyberinterpersonal violence. Reyns et al. (2016) performed a
dichotomous codification of responses using self-report survey data to determine that
offline guardianship was ineffective when compared to online target hardening.
Delimiting research makes it possible for researchers to go outside the bounds of routine
activity theory and focus on victim behavior.
Researchers collect data from existing surveys to test constructs of routine activity
theory. Reyns (2015) focused on Internet victimization as a construct of routine activity
theory using survey data. Reyns measured the constructs of the routine activity
framework after operationalizing dichotomous survey response data as victims of hacking
and malware or victims of phishing to find that online behavior directly correlated with
victimization. Reyns and Henson (2016) combined efforts using the same sample data to
study online identity theft victimization with routine activity theory and found risky online
behavior correlated with an increased chance of identity theft victimization. Researchers
can use routine activity theory constructs to determine if victim behavior directly relates
to online identity theft.
Behavior and personality are testable within routine activity theory. Vries and
Gelder (2015) conducted an investigation using routine activity theory to determine
personality as a predictor of crime. Nikitkov et al. (2014) compared routine activity
triangle with motivated offender as the element connecting routine activity to the fraud
triangle of deceptive eBay seller activity. Holtfreter et al. (2015) explored how low selfcontrol contributes to making risky remote-purchase decisions and subsequently
contributes to identity theft victimization. Chen et al. (2017) determined that individuals
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willing to participate in risky online investments, participate in online shopping, and open
e-mails from untrusted parties increased the likelihood of Internet scam victimization.
One trend in routine activity theory research in the online realm is examining victim
behavior correlates.
Combining routine activity theory with other theoretical constructs is an effective
way to study routine activity theory in different environmental contexts. Mui and Mailley
(2015) created a theoretical perspective of one perpetrator misappropriating assets
mapped to the crime triangle of routine activity theory, with the fraud triangle as an
overlay for an environmental perspective. Kodellas et al. (2015) determined low selfcontrol was not significant in predicting physical or property victimization in the
workplace using routine activity theory. Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) studied phishing
and malware victims who were online banking customers in the Netherlands and
determined that everyone is susceptible to banking fraud victimization, with target
suitability having a slight influence on the likelihood of victimization. Not all researchers
have attributed victim behavior to victimization risk.
Archived reports of victimization support testing elements of routine activity
theory. Holt et al. (2016) used global computer emergency response team reports of
malware infections as total reported accounts of malware infection with macrocorrelates
of malware infection at the national level and found that countries with a more advanced
technological infrastructure were more likely to report malware infection. Brady et al.
(2016) redefined household activity ratio to trend financial cybercrime victimization to
demonstrate that those completing financial transactions online were at higher risk of
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victimization. Paek and Nalla (2015) lacked data points related to guardianship but found
a correlation between victims receiving phishing attempts and identity theft and noted
that underreporting may exist because victims may not be aware that they are victims.
Regardless of the quality of archived victim reports, it is possible that missing data might
prevent an accurate representation of the scope of cybervictimization or victims of
ransomware.
Cybersecurity
Effective strategies to address ransomware exist within cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity is the strategy organizational leaders use to protect digital assets from harm
(Haimes, Horowitz, Guo, Andrijcic, & Bogdanor, 2015). Cybersecurity is relevant from
national security interests to local businesses in enabling the long-term success of the
digital economy (Teoh & Mahmood, 2017). Retail business cybersecurity target risks
include people, data, and intellectual property (Densham, 2015). When discussing
cybersecurity, it becomes necessary to define who they are protecting, what they are
defending, and how to protect the target; targets exist within the confines of personal
information, critical infrastructure, e-commerce, military threats, and intellectual property
(Carr, 2016). A motivated offender is the last component needed to fulfill the
requirements of routine activity theory as an investigative lens in cybersecurity.
The basis of cybersecurity strategy is the threat of the existence of motivated
offenders. Motivated criminal actors use fraud to deceive victims and penetrate
vulnerable systems (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015). Critical business and government
functions exist online and are susceptible to attack (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015). The
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ability of cybercriminals to pose a threat from a distance complicates cybersecurity
strategy and jurisdiction boundaries (Williams & Levi, 2015). Multiple attack vectors
further complicate cybersecurity strategy.
Cybersecurity strategy implications affect how companies conduct business. The
importance of the private sector in cybersecurity initiatives dominates the cybersecurity
initiative discussion, as business leaders’ in the private sector maintain and operate 85–
90% of cyberinfrastructure (Štitilis, Pakutinskas, Laurinaitis, & Malinauskaitė-van de
Castel, 2017). Cybersecurity strategy and application vary between companies due to a
lack of standardization in documenting and applying cybersecurity strategy (Štitilis,
Pakutinskas, Kinis, & Malinauskaitė, 2016). Employees with personal devices on the
corporate network, customer expectations, and poor communication with upper
management weaken cybersecurity (Patel, 2015). Effective cybersecurity strategy
requires engaging stakeholders to satisfy operational requirements.
Determining the best method to incorporate cybersecurity into business strategy is
challenging. Cybersecurity requirements change based on the value and sensitivity of the
data (Goutas, Sutanto, & Aldarbesti, 2016). A significant challenge for business leaders is
continually aligning business strategy and technology in unstable environments
(Hinkelmann et al., 2016). Lacking a proper cybersecurity strategy is a business formula
for inevitable failure (Goutas et al., 2016). Available cybersecurity tools and the methods
used in organizations to store and retrieve information are incapable of protecting data
and resources from criminal actors (German, 2016). Cybercriminals captured over 600
million U.S. customer financial records from the retail sector in 2013 and 2014, and most
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breaches have occurred since 2007 (Hemphill & Longstreet, 2016). A lack of cohesion
between cybersecurity and business strategy is detrimental to operations and to
maintaining a positive public image.
The depth and scope of a cybersecurity strategy contains specific and measureable
characteristics and provides accountability for failure. Characteristics of an effective
cybersecurity strategy are multiple perspectives, support from senior staff, behavior and
awareness training, internal and external information-sharing alliances, and staying up to
date with best practices (Esteves, Ramalho, & Haro, 2017). A weak link in cybersecurity
is the employee (Manworren, Letwat, & Daily, 2016). Organizations with vulnerability
intelligence of attackable targets have an advantage in mitigating cybersecurity threats
(Smyth, 2016). Strategic management of cybersecurity strategy requires the identification
of capabilities and resources to increase organizational performance by continually
improving and adapting the cybersecurity strategy (Azevedo et al., 2015). Measureable
characteristics of cybersecurity strategy include the defining terms and common uses of
the term cybersecurity, which encompass a range of semantics with risk, asset, and
environment as the most common (Schatz, Bashroush, & Wall, 2017). Designing an
effective cybersecurity strategy requires a holistic understanding of an organization.
Applying routine activity theory to cybersecurity strategy requires the
identification of available constructs. The available constructs exist within prior research
and literature on routine activity theory. The following constructs map directly to routine
activity theory.
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Cybersecurity offenders. Cybersecurity offenders, similar to ransomware
offenders, are the criminal actors who perpetrate attacks against cybertargets. Without a
cybersecurity offender, there is no crime (Näsi et al., 2017). Cybersecurity offenders can
either randomly choose targets or selectively choose targets to victimize.
Cybersecurity targets. Cybersecurity targets are cybertargets consisting of the
information systems or technology of potential victims. Cybersecurity targets are a
necessary element for cybercrime (Näsi et al., 2017). Behavior of potential cybersecurity
victims may play a role in target suitability. Cybersecurity targets consist of potential
victims who lack adequate training or protection.
Cybersecurity target value. Cybersecurity target value changes based on
selectivity factors and perceived value of the attack. The influence of the perceived target
value remains unknown (Näsi et al., 2017). Depending on the value of the information
systems or technology, the potential victim may implement measures to safeguard their
systems.
Cybersecurity target protection. Cybersecurity target protection consists of
protecting or taking adequate precautions to protect owned information systems or
technology. If no target protection exists, it may lessen the difficulty for a criminal actor
to compromise the system or technology (Näsi et al., 2017). Whether cybersecurity target
protection is effective in mitigating a potential attack remains unknown.
Cybersecurity and ransomware. Similarities exist between cybersecurity and
ransomware in their application to routine activity theory; however, the relationship
between cybersecurity and ransomware is distinct and does not share all qualities equally.
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Ransomware is a component of cybersecurity, and researchers expect to observe shared
qualities between spatial and antispatial routine activity research (Näsi et al., 2017). In
the context of business and effective business strategy, additional implications to
adequate protection may exist.
Strategic Management and Ransomware Cybersecurity
The strategic management of information systems and technology has a role in the
adequate protection and guardianship constructs of routine activity theory. Companies
have a global market of cybersecurity networks to assist in strategically managing
cybersecurity (Bailetti & Zijdemans, 2014). Cybersecurity start-up companies offer
holistic security solutions, digital identity protection, security automation, distributed
security, integration services, password products, security simulation and testing, and
training (Bailetti & Zijdemans, 2014). Strategic risk management plans contain
provisions for unexpected technology failures (Fraser & Simkins, 2016). Strategically
managing costs associated with cybersecurity includes properly classifying costs related
to testing versus implementation of cybersecurity tools and strategies (Radziwill &
Benton, 2017). Strategically managing cybersecurity requires establishing a budget to
protect digital company assets from cybercriminals.
The strategic management of cybersecurity is critical in connected company
information systems and technology. Over the past 10 years of strategic management of
cybersecurity, cybersecurity failures have cost companies billions of dollars (Hooper &
McKissack, 2016). The strategic management of cybersecurity includes electronic
information security management systems and proactively monitoring the influence of
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cybersecurity programs on the performance and productivity of the workforce (Baronienė
& Žirgutis, 2017). The practice of strategic risk management leads to resiliency within
company operations (Fraser & Simkins, 2016). In large organizations, a separate position
outside the IT department oversees cybersecurity; however, in smaller organizations
typically the corporate information officer handles the strategic management of
cybersecurity (Hooper & McKissack, 2016). Small business owners use cloud
technologies to stay competitive (Forde, 2017). Business leaders responsible for
overseeing cybersecurity handle the strategic management of cybersecurity and internal
structure with different internal and external controls depending on the size and structure
of the organization (Hooper & McKissack, 2016). The tenets of strategic cybersecurity
management align with routine activity theory in networked company information
systems.
Ransomware and Business
The threat of ransomware is high, with devastating consequences in the event of a
successful breach to business information systems. Attackers using cryptovirology are
responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars in losses annually, and they continue to
evolve ransomware technology to circumvent systems designed to protect information
systems while eluding law enforcement with cryptocurrency payouts anonymized in the
blockchain (Richardson & North, 2017). The success of the cryptovirology criminal
enterprise indicates a failure in preventing successful attacks. The routine activity theory
framework as applied to the study appears in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Routine activity theory as applied to the study of ransomware.
Figure 1 depicts the elements necessary for ransomware offenders to circumvent
protection, a lack of adequate guardianship, and subsequent compromise of the target
information system. The element of adequate guardianship is a primary focus for research
involving cybersecurity threats and routine activity theory. A lack of innovation in
maintaining adequate protection against ransomware creates opportunity for offenders to
extort their victims (Richardson & North, 2017; Young & Yung, 2017). The lack of
adequate guardianship or protection against ransomware infection is relevant, within the
confines of routine activity theory, if a motivated offender and target exist.
Small business leaders use specific strategies to provide adequate guardianship,
limit target visibility, and prevent motivated offenders from compromising the target.
Some small business leaders lack strategies to address ransomware and assume adequate
cybersecurity protection is in place. The codification of small business leader
cybersecurity strategies as active or passive is relevant to the study of cybersecurity
strategy. Within the confines of active or passive cybersecurity strategy, unique elements
might exist in addressing ransomware infection that apply to other attack vectors outside
the scope of ransomware.
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Predicting the thematic development and codification of the effective strategies
small business leaders use to address ransomware involves bounding relevant data. In
case study research, bounding the data and operationalizing conceptual measures improve
quality (Yin, 2018). Exploring small business leaders’ strategies for effectively
addressing ransomware using the routine activity theory construct of adequate
guardianship might reveal direct and indirect influential factors that affect the
effectiveness of cybersecurity strategy. Identifying how small business leaders influence
the organizational cybersecurity posture might lead to a rich understanding of how small
business leaders directly and indirectly mitigate the threat of ransomware in small
business information systems.
The evolution of ransomware creates a moving target for small business leaders
concerned with maintaining adequate protection for their information systems. Adequate
protection entails using the latest operating systems, staying up-to-date on operating
system patches, maintaining on-site and off-site backups, and actively monitoring
vulnerable operating system components with antimalware software (Choudhary et al.,
2016; Richardson & North, 2017). The latest Microsoft operating system, Windows 10,
was effective in preventing ransomware infection in laboratory tests using variants from
the 25 known families of ransomware (Choudhary et al., 2016). The majority of
ransomware infections originate from unsuspecting users clicking on infected links or
opening infected attachments in e-mail (Richardson & North, 2017). Strategies that may
influence the use of e-mail, data backups, using the latest operating systems, and
promoting the use of antivirus or antimalware protection in the organization are
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potentially significant to studying ransomware infection in small business information
systems.
Operationalizing Routine Activity Theory Constructs
Operationalizing the constructs of routine activity theory in the context of small
business information systems and ransomware will allow for the clear identification of
relevant data and themes encountered during codification of the research data. Proper
identification of contextual constructs benefits analysis (Yin, 2018). The contextual
constructs of routine activity theory include motivated offenders, targets, and adequate
guardianship.
Motivated offenders. Research data might contain information about small
business leaders understanding the inherent risks involved in using information systems,
the Internet, and the presence of motivated offenders. Knowledge of why motivated
offenders choose to behave in a criminal manner is not a prerequisite of routine activity
theory (Wang et al., 2015). Information systems exposed to the Internet inherit a
precursory qualification of inclusion in the motivated offender construct (Näsi et al.,
2017). A lack of a priori knowledge of motivated offenders does not predicate the
presence or absence of motivated offenders targeting small business information systems;
however, the common utility of small business information systems connected to the
Internet justifies the assumption of the existence of motivated offenders threatening the
cyberenvironment.
Targets. Understanding the components of a small business information system
targeted by motivated offenders allows for proper identification of the prerequisites
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required for adequate protection. Unpatched or outdated operating systems are vulnerable
targets to ransomware infections (Choudhary et al., 2016; Richardson & North, 2017).
The importance of maintaining up-to-date infrastructure is evident in avoiding the
transformation of a target into a compromised target. A focus on the types of operating
systems in use at a small business will provide data to determine target risk and factors of
adequate guardianship for data existing on the small business information system.
Targets exhibit certain behaviors that may increase target viability and
subsequently increase victimization risk. The act of having information systems
connected to the Internet or the use of information systems in general is enough to satisfy
the requirement of a target when using routine activity theory. The original precepts of
routine activity theory do not indicate an influence on victimization based on the
difference between someone leaving the home, and someone leaving the home and
engaging in risky behavior (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). The ease of establishing a proper
definition of a suitable target in cyberspace does not mitigate the problematic antispatial
nature of the cyberrealm (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). However, operationalizing victim
behavior is useful in determining risk for victimization among computer users (Holtfreter
et al., 2015). The problematic nature of examining a target in the antispatial realm
increases the usefulness of operationalizing victim behavior in determining victimization
risk.
VIVA. VIVA contains attributes to categorize target victimization risk. The
attributes of the VIVA proposition are value, inertia, visibility, and access relevant in the
operationalization of constructs of accessible targets (Nikitkov et al., 2014). If the
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primary focus is on adequate guardianship of accessible targets; opportunity exists to
explore possible correlates of VIVA with adequate guardianship. An example of potential
correlates in a small business environment might consist of company documents
indicating value, number of employees indicating inertia, online web presence indicating
visibility, and information system security posture combined with system architectures to
indicate access.
Relative VIVA attributes are identifiable based on the context of the study
environment. Not all data stored on a small business information system share the same
amount of value. To calculate value, data must have monetary worth in the spatial realm
(Wang et al., 2015). Determining the monetary value of small business information data
is not a requirement for establishing target suitability. The number of employees may
have an influence on inertia, as a small business with more employees may have fewer
employees using computers and generating data; however, a small business with more
employees has potentially more human resource data than a small business with fewer
employees, which is a possible interesting difference. Difficulty exists in measuring and
quantifying inertia in the cybercontext (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar,
2016). Visibility, however, is a precursor to understanding target suitability. A potential
cyberattacker might discover a suitable target based on evidence of the potential victims’
online footprint and location (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Wang et
al., 2015). Lack of adequate guardianship predisposes visible targets to increased
victimization risk (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Nikitkov et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). In
the cybercontext, not all VIVA attributes share the same applicability.
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Adequate guardianship. Within the context of the study, target protection is
analogous to adequate guardianship. Adequate guardianship against Internet-based
attacks routinely takes the form of sophisticated firewalls, encryption, installing and
updating protection software, and educating users of risks associated with e-mail
(Holtfreter et al., 2015). Active target protection must satisfy the requirements necessary
to prevent ransomware infection. Continual monitoring for changes in the file system and
registry is one prerequisite for adequate active target protection against ransomware
infection (Choudhary et al., 2016). The role of passive target protection is similar but
identified differently from active target protection. Small business leaders’ support for
maintaining up-to-date infrastructure, budget allocation to information systems, and
cybersecurity concern or lack thereof are examples of possible evidence of passive target
protection. Adequate guardianship justification contains both active and passive
elements.
Thematic development. Observed themes in routine activity theory include
passive and active components mapped to the theory constructs of motivated offenders,
suitable targets, and lack of adequate guardianship. Active component constructs might
consist of the presence of publicly identifiable information about the business, public
listing of e-mail addresses, internal security software features, and proactive target
hardening initiatives. Passive component constructs might consist of data collected
during an interview process directly from the interview participant. It is then important to
identify and segregate any thematic development from outside bounded research to
provide additional context for rival explanations.
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Rivals. For rival explanations, researchers can remain within the constructs of
routine activity theory to posit that motivated offenders or suitable targets might provide
a better explanation of why a target becomes compromised than adequate protection. It is
possible an overlap exists between suitable target and adequate protection; discerning
between adequate protection with target hardening and the existence of a target is
necessary to avoid improper attribution. A possible rival explanation not contained in
routine activity theory is that the victim is at fault. Considering the totality of
circumstances surrounding ransomware, it is possible to avoid victim blaming and instead
choose a victim empowerment perspective using adequate guardianship and remain
within the bounds of routine activity theory. The fraud triangle is another possible rival to
confirm or refute rival suitability. Identifying and exploring possible rivals is a necessary
component of exemplary qualitative case study research (Yin, 2018). The goal of a
researcher conducting exemplary qualitative case study research is not to favor the
predicted outcome by collecting only the data necessary to confirm predicted outcomes or
to consider all possible rivals. The objective of the researcher is to collect and analyze
data without bias to achieve quality, rigor, and trustworthy conclusions.
The motivated offender construct is difficult to extrapolate in the context of
strategies to address ransomware. An unlimited number of motivated offenders exist on
the Internet as people and automated algorithms that participate in random and targeted
criminal acts toward individuals or organizations (Brady et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017;
Holtfreter et al., 2015; Näsi et al., 2017). Identifying the presence of a motivated offender
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without understanding the inclination toward criminal behavior weakens the rival
explanatory position in explaining strategies to address ransomware.
The suitable target construct is likewise difficult to generalize in addressing
ransomware. The definition of a suitable target is satisfied after a person or device
connects or interacts with the Internet (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Leukfeldt & Yar,
2016). The only viable strategy in a suitable target perspective is to avoid the online
environment. Completely avoiding the online environment is not within the context of
realistic expectations for small businesses with a reliance on the Internet infrastructure.
Blaming the victim is unfavorable due to the possibility of double victimization.
Researchers consider victim behavior in probabilistic terms when combining routine
activity theory and lifestyle theory (Pratt & Turanovic, 2016). Risky behaviors place
suitable targets on the Internet at an increased risk of victimization (Holtfreter et al.,
2015). Researchers consider and evaluate demographics of suitable targets to determine
online victimization risk (Blasdell, 2015). In routine activity theory, it is possible to
remove the potential of double victimization with victim blaming because acknowledging
victim behavior is not a requirement.
Regardless of behavior or demographic variables, successfully deceived targets
become victims. One component of the fraud triangle is opportunity (Omidi et al., 2017;
Reinstein & Taylor, 2017; Roden et al., 2016; Rodgers et al., 2015). Deception creates
opportunity for criminal actors and is a precursor to fraud (Agustina, 2015). Suitable
targets deceived into clicking an infected link or opening an infected attachment from a
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phishing scam become victims; however, without access to criminal actors, it is difficult
to investigate the remaining components of the fraud triangle.
Adequate guardianship or the lack thereof remains as the final construct in routine
activity theory in the cyberrealm. Adequate guardianship as a construct within the
cyberrealm defines adequate protection in the form of security hardware, protection
software, or end-user knowledge (Holtfreter et al., 2015). A lack of adequate protection
and a lack of training and education for end users is a likely candidate for addressing
ransomware with capable guardianship from the perspective of small business leaders.
The gap in existing literature on adequate or capable guardianship, small business, and
ransomware is apparent.
Summary
The routine activity theory may help small business leaders to develop effective
strategies to address ransomware. Examples in the literature contain evidence of a lack of
end-user training, failure of adequate guardianship, and an increase in target suitability.
Overcoming the challenges of preventing a ransomware infection and minimizing
damage from ransomware is possible with the proper strategy. End-user training to
address ransomware is a potential strategy to strengthen adequate guardianship and
reducing target suitability. Routine activity theory contains constructs to investigate
effective strategies small business leaders’ use to address ransomware.
Transition
In Section 1, I supplied an account of the proposed study, the background of the
problem, and a review of the literature associated with the research question. I outlined
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the need for small business leaders to stay informed and knowledgeable to counter the
escalating and evolving cybersecurity threat of ransomware to small business information
systems and supporting technologies. I indicated how I investigated how small business
leaders effectively address ransomware and if small business leader strategy aligns with
the routine activity theory construct of adequate guardianship. I attempted to frame the
research question within the conceptual framework and explored possible rival
explanations.
In Section 2, I outline the role of the researcher and justify my research decisions.
As an example, I provide the rationale for inclusion criteria for participation. I then
include the methodology of my research design prior to the collection of data. I explain
how I conduct a multiple-case study to include leaders from multiple small businesses. I
also discuss and provide the rationale for ethical research considerations, data
organization and analysis, collection techniques, and the way I achieved trustworthiness
with dependability, credibility, confirmability, and transferability.
In Section 3, I present my findings, explain the application to professional
practice, and offer recommendations. I use my predictions to compare against observed
themes and cross-case analysis. The discussion in Section 3 includes the applicability of
findings to routine activity theory. I include suggestions for positive social change,
application to small business practice, and recommendations for future research. Finally,
I provide a summary and reflection regarding effective strategies small business leaders
use to address ransomware.
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Section 2: The Project
In Section 2, I focus on how I intend to construct a high-quality qualitative case
study. I discuss my role as a researcher, the participants, and the research method and
design. Section 2 includes ethical research considerations and the methods of data
collection, organization, and analysis. This section includes an explanation of how I
ensured the reliability and validity of my study.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the
cybersecurity strategies some small business leaders use to protect their information
systems from ransomware. The targeted population included five small business leaders
located in the Knox County region of Tennessee who have successfully implemented
cybersecurity strategies to protect their information systems from ransomware. The
study’s implications for positive social change includes the potential for increasing
employment opportunities in the region and supporting the local economy by protecting
information systems from ransomware. Furthermore, small business leaders may realize
the value of their business as a cybercrime target and consider implementing stronger
cybersecurity controls to prevent and mitigate the spread of ransomware to protect
confidential and sensitive consumer information.
Role of the Researcher
I served as the primary data collection instrument to provide the depth of inquiry
possible in postmodern qualitative case study research. Qualitative inquiry allows
researchers to stand in opposition to the scientifically based research movement and go

54
beyond institutionalized truths (Denzin, 2016). In qualitative case study research, the
researcher’s responsibility is to collect data from multiple sources to form convergent
lines of inquiry through interviews, evidence chains, informant review, and existing
records (Yin, 2018). I performed this qualitative case study research of ransomware and
small business using skills gained through academia and working in the technology field
since 1993. I have experience as a small business owner, employee, and contractor for
local business, have worked with more than 20 Fortune 500 companies, local
government, and the U.S. Department of Defense during my time working in the
technology field. I did not include participants from former or current business clientele.
As the primary data collection instrument, I also took into consideration ethical concerns
applicable to my study.
I adhered to principles contained in the Belmont Report to ensure I maintained
acceptable research ethics when working with human subjects. Internal criticisms of
ethical models designed from the Belmont Report to promote principles of respect,
beneficence, and justice in research involving human subjects indicate the common law
as most beneficial to biomedical research and discourages artificially risky qualitative
research (Denzin, 2016). Researchers use the principals identified in the Belmont Report
to undertake ethical research and protect study participants (Goss, 2017; Miracle, 2016;
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 1979). I did not consider my research inherently risky, nor receive
any direct benefit, and I obtained informed consent and followed the Belmont Report
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protocol to ensure the highest ethical standards of protecting the respect, beneficence, and
justice of participants of my study.
A risk for personal bias exists based on my extensive background in information
technology and small business, as I may have had a preconceived idea of what small
business leaders should be doing to address ransomware in their organization. My
personal bias required keeping an open mind and maintaining personal diligence to avoid
misinterpreting data from a personally biased position. Identifying researcher bias
preserves transparency in qualitative research (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Yin, 2018).
Using multiple sources of data reduces selectivity bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2016;
Snow, Richards, & Kinner, 2017; Yin, 2018). Bracketing, member checking, and
bounding the case also reduces bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2016; Morse, 2015; Pacho,
2014; Yin, 2018). A successful member checking strategy includes asking for
clarification and comparative meaning from previous interviews with the current
participant (Yin, 2018). I bracketed my research, used multiple data sources, bound my
case study, and distanced mental conclusions during data collection to mitigate bias and
to purposefully view the data through the conceptual framework of routine activity
theory. I followed an interview protocol (see Appendix). Researchers routinely follow a
strict interview protocol to maintain quality in qualitative case study research (Baškarada,
2014; Noble & Smith, 2015; Yin, 2018). I followed a strict interview protocol, obtained
consent, performed member checking, and accomplished data saturation during data
collection to maintain quality.
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Participants
I established eligibility criteria for the participation of small business leaders on
those who have successfully implemented cybersecurity strategies to protect their
information systems from ransomware to answer my research question. The U.S. Census
Bureau (2018) defines businesses with fewer than 500 full-time employees as a small
business. The U.S. Small Business Administration in combination with U.S. Census
Bureau data classifies over 97% of all businesses in the United States as small businesses
(Congressional Research Service, 2018). The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018)
defines a small business as one with fewer than 20 employees and independently owned
and operated. I used the Australian Bureau of Statistics criteria to narrow the U.S. Census
Bureau definition of small business for participant eligibility to independent owners of
small businesses with fewer than 20 employees located in the Knox County region of
Tennessee who have successfully implemented cybersecurity strategies to protect their
information systems from ransomware.
I located potential candidates through the small business resource directory at the
public library. I determined cursory access to the site, small business ownership, and the
sine qua non of technology in use at the businesses. Researchers in business and
management with flexible research techniques can overcome the challenges inherent with
securing access to participants (Lord, Bolton, Fleming, & Anderson, 2016). Researchers
use cold calling, e-mail, and letters and share potential benefits of the study to secure
access (Fjellström & Guttormsen, 2016). I solicited participation from publicly available
sources and explained the purpose of my study with phone calls, via e-mail, or in person
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with a courtesy introduction via e-mail or letter, and then met with the potential
participants at a time of their choosing.
I established a working relationship with each participant by introducing myself
to the business owner, explaining my research study, and describing the data collection
process. Relationships between researcher and participant are social and vary based on
each participant (Yin, 2016). I explained the potential benefit of my research to small
business leader participants. Clear communication of necessary agreements facilitates a
healthy working relationship and strengthens data collection efforts (Miles, Huberman, &
Saldaña, 2014). After a formal acknowledgment of interest in participating in the study, I
confirmed eligibility, collected informed consent, and let the participant choose a
physical venue or telephone option at a mutually convenient date and time. Interviewers
must maintain a flexible schedule and be willing to meet at participants’ chosen place and
time (Yin, 2014). In the event that the scheduled time or place was not convenient for me,
I adjusted my schedule to accommodate the needs of the participant.
Research Method and Design
I chose a qualitative method after considering quantitative and mixed methods. I
selected a multiple case study design within the qualitative method to study effective
small business leader strategy for addressing ransomware. The context for my research
was multiple small businesses and the unit of analysis was the leader of the respective
small businesses. The multiple case study design provided a research design appropriate
for interviewing multiple small business owners who have an effective strategy for
addressing ransomware.
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Research Method
I use a qualitative research method for this study. Qualitative research is the study
of a social phenomenon, in context, to gain a rich understanding from participants
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Holistic, complex, or interpretive research occurring in the
natural world is characteristic of the qualitative method (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).
Alternatives to the qualitative method include quantitative and mixed-methods. In
quantitative research, the researcher collects data in the form of numbers and statistics
and tests a hypothesis (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). I was not testing a hypothesis;
rather, I was exploring what effective strategies small business leaders use and how they
overcame related challenges in addressing ransomware.
I did not use the quantitative method, as I did not intend to test a hypothesis.
Researchers use mixed-methods design to combine qualitative and quantitative
methodologies and to test variables (Halcomb & Hickman, 2015). A mixed-methods
approach was inappropriate because I did not intend to collect numbers or statistical data
and test a hypothesis in combination with qualitative data to explore the research question
and perform variable comparisons.
I used the qualitative method to explore context in the natural world to answer a
research question. The vehicle for this exploration was semistructured interviews, which
facilitate an in-depth exploration of the topic. Researchers who conduct semistructured
interviews go beyond the quantitative resemblance of structured interviewing to
overcome the lack of clear direction with unstructured interviewing techniques (Wilson,
2016). Qualitative interviewing techniques allow researchers to obtain rich data from
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participants not otherwise available with other methods (Lancaster, 2017; McVey, Lees,
& Nolan, 2016). Qualitative methods aligned with my objective to gain a rich
understanding of what strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware and
provide access to data otherwise unavailable with other methods.
Research Design
I chose a qualitative multiple case study research design after considering case
study, phenomenology, and narrative research designs. A qualitative case study research
design is appropriate for a deep exploration of a phenomenon in a business context
(Achtenhagen, Brunninge, & Melin, 2017; Arasti, Khaleghi, & Noori, 2017; Jarvis &
Williams, 2017). Researchers use case study research for flexibility in forming a holistic
perspective of what is shared and unique about the case (Hyett, Kenny, & Dickson-Swift,
2014). Researchers use cross-case analysis to explore individual cases holistically within
multiple contexts as a way to create a replicable study (Yin, 2018). A case study design is
appropriate when the researcher intends to understand the viewpoint of participants
(Baškarada, 2014). I used interview questions aligned with my research question to
explore the sophisticated phenomenon of effective strategies small business leaders use to
address ransomware.
In phenomenology research, researchers attempt to understand cognition and
expectations (Fawcett, Fawcett, Cooper, & Daynes, 2014). I was not attempting to
explore expectations of participants; therefore, the phenomenology research design was
inappropriate. Researchers use narrative research to explore the experience of unique
populations (McCann & Brown, 2017). I was not seeking to explore the experience of
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small business leaders, but rather, their strategies to address ransomware in their small
business.
Researchers have used case study research to indicate the importance of
leadership skills in the business sector (Creţu & Iova, 2015). Data gathered from
interviews with small business leaders in this multiple case study research may indicate
effective strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware. Researchers have
also used a qualitative case study research design for investigating ransomware (Ali,
2017; Pascariu, Barbu, & Bacivarov, 2017; Patyal, Sampalli, Qiang, & Rahman, 2017). I
conducted semistructured interviews to gain a rich understanding of the phenomenon in a
bounded replication multiple case study design. Design replication in case study research
occurs during the purposeful selection of cases to include during the design stage (Yin,
2018). I facilitated replication by limiting case selection to the small business sector.
Data saturation in qualitative case study research design indicates quality and
rigor. Data, themes, coding, and replication are universal elements in defining data
saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Data saturation occurs once shared commonalities
among interview participants cease (Constantinou, Georgiou, & Perdikogianni, 2017) and
when no gain of new information is possible (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Marshall & Rossman,
2016; Yin, 2018). I analyzed data collected from interview responses and company
documents, identified all possible themes, and remained open to expanding my
participant pool if needed until I achieved data saturation.
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Population and Sampling
The population for this study consisted of five independent small business owners
with fewer than 20 employees located in the Knox County region of East Tennessee who
use information systems in their organization and have applied strategies to avoid
ransomware. I was interested in achieving a depth of understanding only possible with a
small number of participants. In-depth qualitative research with information-rich
participants justifies a small number of informants (Boddy, 2016; Malterud, Siersma, &
Guassora, 2016; Van Rijnsoever, 2017). A purposive sampling method supports selection
criteria based on the data collection strategy (Roy, Zvonkovic, Goldberg, Sharp, &
LaRossa, 2015). A maximal information strategy is appropriate for purposive sampling
when researchers are highly familiar with the field and population (Van Rijnsoever,
2017). Purposive sampling is appropriate when using selection criteria to target a specific
population (Asiamah, Mensah, & Oteng-Abayie, 2017; Roy, & Basu, 2015). Establishing
trust and using a gatekeeper to coordinate the researcher with a participant is effective in
overcoming the challenges inherent with interviewing difficult-to-reach populations
(Kasim & Al-Gahuri, 2015). I used purposive sampling to choose independent small
business owners within the Knox County region of East Tennessee who use information
systems in their businesses.
I achieved data saturation through member checking and triangulation with
purposive sampling, maximal information, and bounded case design. Data saturation is
possible with only a single informant within in-depth qualitative research (Boddy, 2016).
Data saturation is unique to each study, dictated by study design, and possible once no
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new themes or explanations for data exist (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Miles et al., 2014;
Morse, 2015). I conducted interviews with a minimum of five participants to achieve data
saturation.
Ethical Research
I maintained and adhered to ethical standards required by the Institutional Review
Board (IRB) at Walden University. Approval by the IRB is essential in scholarly
qualitative research, and researchers should disclose values or conflicts of interest
(Denzin, 2016). I followed all requirements of IRB and disclosed values and conflict of
interest to ensure compliance with ethical research. Ethical research considerations exist
at the outset, during, and after the conclusion of research (Drake, 2014). The Walden
University IRB approval number for this study is 05-02-19-0612293. I received consent
from participants, provided participant withdrawal procedures, and took necessary
precautions to protect participants and data before, during, and after the completion of the
study.
Informed consent is part of a process to allow participants to understand a study
before deciding whether to take part. Participants received adequate time to review,
understand, and sign an emailed, mailed, or hand delivered informed consent letter prior
to inclusion in the study. Informed consent protects the participant, researcher, and
institution from potential harm arising from participation in research (Byerley et al.,
2017; Petrovic, 2017). Complex certificates of confidentiality lower participant trust,
while simple and accurate language increases trust and participation (Beskow, Check, &
Ammarell, 2014). A significant risk in research is that participants will not dedicate
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enough time to reading consent forms to ensure proper understanding and instead will
perform only a cursory read before signing (Knepp, 2014). An IRB may work with
researchers to customize consent form language appropriate to a study (Check, Wolf,
Dame, & Beskow, 2014). I ensured participants were aware of what they were consenting
to and that consent was for the entire scope and duration of the study.
Participants could withdraw from the study at any time. I allowed participants to
make their request to withdraw from the study at any time before or during the study by
phone call, by text message, in person, or by e-mail. An informed consent form
containing clear instructions of what happens if a participant withdraws supports a
researcher’s action and decision to use partial data (Thorpe, 2014). Participants did not
suffer any penalties for withdrawing at any time before or during the study, and I
discarded any research from participants who withdrew from the study.
I used pseudonyms with the naming convention of P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5 to
protect the identity of participants and stored all research data on an encrypted and
password-protected USB storage device. I outlined my responsibilities in protecting the
collected research data while seeking informed consent. The researcher’s responsibility is
to avoid divulging demographics or other identifying characteristics that may violate
participant confidentiality (Morse & Coulehan, 2015). I did not consider demographic
constructs and did not disclose demographic markers of participants beyond the general
region of the location of the study. Data stored on encrypted and password-protected
USB storage will be stored for 5 years in a biometric safe located in my home office. I
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use pseudonyms and will destroy all research data after 5 years to protect participant
confidentiality.
Data Collection Instruments
I was the data collection instrument for the study. I conducted semistructured
interviews, examined company documents, followed an interview protocol (see
Appendix), and performed member checking. I used open-ended semistructured
interviews to gather data on effective strategies to address ransomware in small business.
Interviews are one way to gather a large amount of data from participants on problems
that are technical in nature (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Some researchers use an
interview protocol to conduct semistructured interviews (Cohen & Kassan, 2018; Mao &
Bottorff, 2017; Sollie, Kop, & Euwema, 2017). In a semistructured interview, the
interviewer has the flexibility to prompt for additional information as interesting
information emerges from questions contained in the interview protocol (Baškarada,
2014). Member checking enhances the interview protocol to determine if what the
interviewer understands and what the participant means is correct (Yin, 2018). I
attempted to enhance the reliability and validity of the study using an interview protocol
and member checking process. Member checking occurs during the initial interview and
after data analysis is complete (Yin, 2018). I conducted interviews and performed
immediate member checking during the initial interview with the participant and
executed a later member check by contacting participants by telephone or email after data
analysis.
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I requested copies of company documents showing the types of information
systems in use at the small business, information security training programs, and
information security software and hardware. Company documents contain contextual
information used for validating and triangulating data (Marshall & Rossman, 2016).
Company documents for this case included purchase receipts, training documentation,
and an inventory of operating systems, security software, and security devices. Security
in the form of antivirus software might contain provisions to prevent a ransomware
infection (Patyal et al., 2017). Beyond antivirus software, end-user behavior also has a
significant role in preventing ransomware infection (Ali, 2017). Documents that might
reveal company choice of operating systems, antivirus software, and training that affects
end user behavior are important to understanding effective strategies used to address
ransomware. I collected documents necessary to form a holistic view of the state of the
information systems in use at the companies and to corroborate interview findings.
Data Collection Technique
I explored effective strategies to address ransomware by conducting interviews,
reviewing archival records, and gathering company documents. A sense of trust between
the interviewee and the interviewer, facilitated when the interviewer receives a referral to
the interviewee from someone else, improves the sharing of data in semistructured
interviews (Nguyen, 2015). To achieve an intimate understanding of a phenomenon and
to capture interviewees’ viewpoint requires a balance of neutral and embodied inquiry
(Alby & Fatigante, 2014). In a semistructured interview, the interviewer can expand the
inquiry as information emerges to develop a better understanding of the interviewees’
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viewpoint (Baškarada, 2014). Disadvantages of using interviews as a data collection
technique include the possibility of misunderstanding interviewees’ responses and the
influence of bias from interviewer or interviewee in interpreting responses or providing
responses to interview questions (Baškarada, 2014). However, I mitigated these
disadvantages by identifying my biases, verifying interviewee responses, and conducting
as many follow-up member checking sessions as necessary to ensure I captured the
interviewees’ viewpoint.
I conducted member checking to enhance the reliability and validity of data
collection. Member checking occurs when the researcher builds trust in the results by
reviewing analyzed interview data from a participant interview with the participant to
verify, modify, and confirm the analysis (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, & Walter, 2016).
Member checking can increase the rigor of information systems research involving
participants and in deriving if participant meanings from interview questions align with
researcher interpretations (Iivari, 2018). A researcher can confirm and validate with
member checking by providing a summary of the interview to the interviewee (Marshall
& Rossman, 2016). I engaged in member checking during and after each interview with
the participant to increase my depth of understanding of participant meaning to the
interview question responses.
I digitally recorded the interviews. Researchers can digitally record interviews
and transcribe interviews verbatim (Fernandez, Sheppard-Law, Curtis, Bancroft, &
Smith, 2018; Kohn, Belza, Petrescu-Prahova, & Miyawaki, 2016; Porteous & Machin,
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2018). After digitally recording the interview, I transferred the digital recording to a
computer with an encrypted hard drive and transcribed the interview verbatim.
I kept a reflective journal during the study. Researchers can use reflective
journaling during the data collection phase of research to increase awareness and improve
research quality (Digby, Lee, & Williams, 2016; Perlman et al., 2018; Zulfikar &
Mujibur, 2018). I used a composition book to handwrite reflective journal entries during
and after the interview. I digitized my reflective journal and stored it with the transcribed
interview on an encrypted hard drive.
I requested company documents and archival records. Researchers can use
semistructured interviews and company documents to corroborate and triangulate data
(Jussani, Wright, & Ibusuki, 2017; Kaminska & Borzillo, 2017; Ye & Lau, 2018). One
disadvantage to archival records is they can be challenging to search and may be
incomplete (Jones & O’Neill, 2014). However, diligently searching through data from
archival research can lead to new meaning and hidden truths (Norquay, 2017). I
requested copies of company documents and archival records showing the types of
information systems in use at the small business, information security training programs,
and information security software and hardware.
Data Organization Technique
I used a purposeful and methodical approach to organize my data. I temporarily
stored all collected data on an encrypted hard drive in a research folder with separate
codified folders for each participant. I maintained a backup copy of the research folder on
an encrypted and password-protected USB drive. I used a digital recorder to record the
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interviews and then transfer the recordings to a computer with a password protected and
encrypted hard drive. I transcribed the interviews into a Microsoft Word document for
data analysis and to back up the original audio files; I transcribed my reflective journal
into multiple Word documents and stored the file inside the respective coded participant
folder. Next, I organized and digitally stored the company documents that I collected
inside the coded participant folder. I used Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, QSR
NVivo, and Microsoft Azure SQL to organize the collected data for further analysis.
Researchers have used QSR NVivo, spreadsheets, and databases to collect, store, codify,
and analyze research data (Cook, LaVan, & Zilic, 2018; Hunt & Bakker, 2018; Woods,
Paulus, Atkins, & Macklin, 2016). After I completed the data analysis, I made a final
backup of the contents of the research folder onto two encrypted and password-protected
USB drives. I stored the USB drives in a biometric-protected safe, to which only I had
access, in my home office for at least 5 years. I will have erased the contents of the USB
drives after the mandatory 5-year retention period.
Data Analysis
I followed a reiterative process of analyzing collected data. Qualitative
researchers can analyze data using a reiterative process of reviewing data, organizing
data, coding data, and developing themes (Miles et al., 2014; Yin, 2014, 2018). Yin
(2016) noted a five-cycle approach to this reiterative process would include (a)
compiling, (b) disassembling, (c) reassembling, (d) interpreting, and (e) concluding. I
used these reiterative approaches to guide my data analysis process decisions.
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The process of reviewing and compiling data included source material from
interview transcripts, member checking, reflective journal entries, and company
documents. I carefully organized my data into a meaningful database to prepare the initial
codification, disassembling, and reassembling. I used methodological triangulation to
perform my data analysis. Case study triangulation consists of methodological,
investigator, theory, and data source triangulation (Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso,
Blythe, & Neville, 2014; Renz, Carrington, & Badger, 2018). Triangulation involves
converging multiple sources of data (Marshall & Rossman, 2016). Data in
methodological triangulation can come from sources such as interviews and company
documents (Abdalla, Oliveira, Azevedo, & Gonzalez, 2018), and a researcher can use
these data sources to provide a rich understanding of the studied phenomenon (Varpio,
Ajjawi, Monrouxe, O’Brien, & Rees, 2017). I performed data analysis to identify themes
using methodological triangulation with interviews and company documents, which
included information system specifications and training documents.
I engaged in an iterative and methodological process of analyzing collected data
from each case. I analyzed the collected data using different techniques. One technique of
case study data analysis is using pattern matching logic (Yin, 2018). I codified the data
and looked for patterns. Another technique is cross-case synthesis, where the researcher
compares case conclusions to answer the research question (Yin, 2018). I went beyond
treating each case as an independent topic and explored the combined cases from a
holistic perspective to identify themes and phenomena of effective strategies to address
ransomware.
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Researchers can use computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software to
iteratively explore their data and identify patterns (Yin, 2018). I used QSR International
(QSR) NVivo to assist in identifying patterns and analyzing the data. Cook et al. (2018)
used QSR NVivo to analyze almost 10 million words from reports using categories
developed from a conceptual framework. Hunt and Bakker (2018) performed a similar
analysis using audio-recorded data and QSR NVivo. Woods et al. (2016) reported most
researchers from 763 empirical studies used NVivo for data management and analysis. I
repeated the process of disassembling and reassembling until substantive themes
emerged. I interpreted the data against the literature, conceptual framework, and rival
explanations to conclude and report my research findings.
I initially based my interpretation on themes identified in the literature review.
The themes included (a) adequate guardianship, (b) suitable targets and VIVA constructs,
(c) motivated offenders, (d) within framework rivalry, (e) victim behavior rival, and (f)
fraud triangle deception rival. Adhering to the themes identified in the literature review
allowed for a thorough examination using the conceptual framework and a comparison
against rival explanations.
Reliability and Validity
A qualitative case study research approach using routine activity theory goes
beyond quantitative hypothesis testing. Reliability and validity are predominant in
quantitative research (Cypress, 2017); however, creating and following a strict case study
protocol in qualitative research achieves the same rigor (Denzin, 2016; Yin, 2018).
Qualitative methods are beneficial in cybersecurity strategy research (Štitilis et al., 2017).
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Following a case study protocol supports theory development through a rich
understanding of the case study (Baškarada, 2014). I followed a qualitative case study
protocol to develop a rich understanding of the phenomenon.
Reliability
Researchers interpret reliability through a qualitative lens to determine
dependability. The dependability of a study is the extent to which the study is repeatable
with similar results (Grossoehme, 2014; Yin, 2018). Following a strict case study
protocol increases repeatability (Noble & Smith, 2015; Yin, 2018). Member checking,
data interpretation, bracketing, and methodological triangulation increases the
dependability and replicability of case study research (Morse, 2015; Pacho, 2014; Yin,
2018). I followed a strict case study protocol, used bracketing, included multiple sources
of data for methodological triangulation, and conducted member checking to achieve
study dependability and replicability.
Validity
Quality in qualitative case study research consists of identifiable factors. Critical
factors of quality in qualitative case study research include credibility, transferability,
confirmability, and data saturation (Yin, 2018). The critical factors of quality as applied
to this study are discussed below.
Validate. Validation is a critical factor of quality. Validating participant
responses with member checking is one method to establish credibility (Cope, 2014;
Noble & Smith, 2015; Taylor & Thomas-Gregory, 2015). Qualitative credibility also
involves identifying bias and keeping detailed research logs (Noble & Smith, 2015;

72
Taylor & Thomas-Gregory, 2015). I validated participant responses with member
checking, identified my biases, and maintained a research log to ensure credibility.
Transfer. Transferability is another critical factor of quality. Transferability is a
decision best made by other researchers based on the robustness of the research and is
dependent upon providing sufficient detail on the development of themes, participant
selection, and context of the case study (Cope, 2014; Elo et al., 2014; Smith & Noble,
2014; Taylor & Thomas-Gregory, 2015). I provided a rich description of thematic
development, described how I chose participants, and provided a clear distinction
between case and context of the study to improve transferability.
Confirm. The next critical factor of quality is confirmation. Confirmability exists
when external examination corroborates distinct research conclusions beyond the
culmination of data gathered from participants (Cope, 2014; Elo et al., 2014; Noble &
Smith, 2015). I did not treat each case as a single data set but rather as a composite to
identify complex themes and phenomena to aid in confirming research conclusions.
Saturate. An additional critical factor of quality is saturation. Data saturation
occurs once no new information is observed (Boddy, 2016; Cleary, Horsfall, & Hayter,
2014; Cronin, 2014; Fusch & Ness, 2015; Gross, Blue-Banning, Turnbull, & Francis,
2015; Smith & Noble, 2014). I conducted member checking during and after the
interview process, kept detailed research logs, identified researcher bias, detailed the
codification process, engaged in purposive participant selection, differentiated findings
from participant-provided information, and used replication logic until data saturation to
establish quality and rigor.
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Transition and Summary
In Section 2, I restated the purpose statement, outlined the role of the researcher,
and described participants. Participants included small business owners in the Knox
County region of Tennessee. I continued in Section 2 with identifying the research
method, research design, population and sampling, and information about ethical
research. I described how I conducted my research according to ethical standards as set
forth by the Walden IRB. I also discussed my role as the data collection instrument, as
well as the data collection technique, data organization, data analysis, and the way I
addressed reliability and validity. Further, I discussed how I used methodological
triangulation to perform data analysis and support research rigor.
In Section 3, I present my findings and provide recommendations for possible
future research. I continue in Section 3 by comparing my predictions with observed
themes and rival explanations. Section 3 also includes a discussion of the benefits to
business practice and society. After sharing my recommendations possible future
research, I provide my reflections of the research process and my concluding thoughts.
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Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change
In Section 2, I addressed the bias in my data collection, participant selection, the
research method and design, ethical considerations, and data collection technique. In
Section 3, I present the findings from data collection, discuss the application to
professional practice, social change implications, and provide recommendations for
action and further research. I close with my reflections on the doctoral journey and
conclusion of the research.
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study was to explore the
cybersecurity strategies some small business leaders use to protect their information
systems from ransomware. Findings from this study may aid small business leaders in
developing effective strategies to address ransomware. The findings came from data I
collected by interviewing five small business leaders located in the southeast region of
the United States, from reviewing company documents, and from examining peerreviewed literature. In the following sections, I explore themes developed from the data. I
identified three emergent themes from the interviews and document review. The
emergent themes were (a) ransomware strategy, (b) support structure, and (c)
cybersecurity awareness. The findings support the conclusions and answer the research
question about effective strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware.
Presentation of the Findings
The research question for this study was as follows: What cybersecurity strategies
do some small business leaders use to protect their information systems from
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ransomware? After data analysis I found three emergent themes. The three emergent
themes were (a) ransomware strategy, (b) support structure, and (c) cybersecurity
awareness. The emergent themes from participant comments appear in Table 1 with
percentage of contribution to emergent theme.
Table 1
Emergent Study Themes

Theme
Theme 1: Ransomware strategy
Theme 2: Support structure
Theme 3: Cybersecurity awareness

Total
contributing
participants
5
5
5

Percentage of
contribution to
emergent theme
100
100
100

All five participants contributed to each emergent theme. Themes were developed
by comparing manually and auto-coded themes from QSR NVivo using data collected
from interview transcripts, member checking, reflective journal entries, and company
documents.
Theme 1: Ransomware Strategy
Each participant expressed “[using] antivirus” as a strategy for effectively
addressing ransomware. Bergmann et al. (2018) identified protective factors to avoid
becoming a victim of cybercrime include using antivirus software, keeping software
updated, using strong passwords, verifying the safety of websites, and deleting suspicious
emails. Participant P2 and participant P4 lacked confidence in older versions of antivirus
and thought to upgrade to the latest versions of software as just as important for
effectively addressing ransomware. Participant P2 stated, “we use the [factory installed]
virus protection.” Participant P4 stated, “we use [antivirus software] as our protection
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[and recently] upgraded [to stay safe].” Participant P1, participant P3, and participant P5
rely heavily on antivirus and the alerts presented on screen to gauge the effectiveness of
their strategy to effectively address ransomware. Participant P1 stated, “we basically use
an antivirus protection program and it sends out alerts.” Participant P3 was especially
confident in the ability of antivirus to keep their systems safe from ransomware and
stated “[antivirus] works very well and [alerts when the antivirus] cleans everything up.”
Participant P5 stated, “usually they [the antivirus program] will give you a message or
something will appear on your computer telling you that you need to double check or run
a report.” Participant P2 and participant P4 gauged effectiveness by stating that their
information systems had not yet been held for ransom as evidence of effectiveness.
Participant P2 stated, “well, in a very simple manner that we’ve not been infected or not
had to pay a ransom. That is probably the best answer I can give you. I have not been
held ransom yet or had to send anybody a check.” Participant P4 stated, “I haven’t had
any issues and I haven’t had any problems at all.” Three participants rely on alerts, while
two participants gauge effectiveness based on not being held for ransom. The distribution
of how participants gauge the effectiveness of their strategy to address ransomware using
antivirus appear in Table 2 with percentage values.
Table 2
Gauging Effectiveness of Using Antivirus

Response
Alerts
Not being held for ransom

Total contributing
participants
3
2

Percentage of
contribution to response
60
40
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Antivirus emerged as the dominant ransomware strategy small business leaders
use to address ransomware. The majority of small business leaders stated their reliance on
a feedback mechanism in the form of alerts, as a function of the antivirus software, to aid
in gauging the effectiveness of using antivirus. Hampton et al. (2018) observed legacy
cryptographic functions, abnormal file activity, abnormal internet connection attempts,
the creation of start-up items, and obfuscated code execution attempts during ransomware
infection analysis and determined detection was possible at the operating system level.
Small business leaders use antivirus protection to mitigate risks, threats, and attacks at the
operating system level to prevent a ransomware infection.
Antivirus, as the dominant participant response, manifested as evidence for an
effective strategy for mitigating the threat of ransomware and malware to small business
information systems. It is possible that antivirus software is capable of providing
protection even if a user unintentionally performs an adverse action that might
inadvertently infect a previously uninfected information system. Risks, threats, and
attacks from ransomware and malware are addressed using antivirus as protection.
However, the current function of antivirus does not fully address data and network
security concerns for these small business leaders. In compiling interview data, it was
apparent other concerns surfaced. These concerns led to a sub-theme of securing data and
the network.
The sub-theme of securing data and the network emerged from the additional
actions these small business leaders were performing to secure their systems from
ransomware. Data security consisted of the small business leader securing their data and
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the network from ransomware. Information security responsibility and threat targets
included data stored on the computer and data traversing the network. The small business
leaders used similar strategies to secure small business data and the network.
The small business leaders were most concerned with protecting their local data,
and the threat from ransomware was not singled out among any specific cybersecurity
threat as more or less dangerous from the small business leader perspective. Participant
P3 and participant P5 have a formal procedure in place for backing up their data
regularly, and both use antivirus software with the capability of only allowing approved
or known good applications to run or make changes to data. Thomas and Galligher
(2018) suggested having data backups available for restoring company data to a date that
would have preceded the occurrence of a ransomware infection. Thomas and Galligher
also suggested, as an additional precaution, using data backups that are at least 14 to 21
days older than the ransomware infection date to prevent an inadvertent reintroduction of
ransomware. The most recent data backup might contain the malicious code responsible
for infecting the information system with ransomware. In two instances, participant P3
and participant P5 were using USB thumb drives to back up their data. The USB drives
were also disconnected from the information system and stored in a safe place to protect
from environmental threats such as fire or unauthorized access as an additional safety
precaution.
Threats to data traversing the network and general connectivity beyond the local
information system are exterior to local storage of protected small business data. All
participants were most concerned with protecting the local information system rather than
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any data stored outside of their local information system. Participants assumed their
antivirus software provided protection regardless of the threat vector or target. However,
ransomware is not limited to infecting information systems used to support business
processes but rather any system capable of storing data (Brody et al., 2018). The threat
posed by ransomware has the potential to affect other systems that are not locally
attached or directly used to support business processes and requires additional network
protection to limit threat exposure.
One method of protecting the network and limiting exposure is through the use of
a firewall for devices connected over a network. In all instances, the participants were
unaware of the function of the firewall. However, all participants were using a physical
firewall integrated with their modem provided by their Internet service provider (ISP) or
using a second physical firewall in conjunction with the firewall provided by their ISP as
an added layer of security. Additionally, all participants had software-based firewalls
enabled at the operating systems level and benefited from the network protections
provided by their antivirus solution.
Theme 2: Support Structure
An additional theme discovered from the data analysis was the emergence of
support structures to address ransomware. Ransomware victims experience four stages of
an attack that includes infection, encryption, demand, and outcome (Hampton et al.,
2018). Pre-planning is required to prevent initial infection and subsequent encryption of
protected data. The demand and eventual outcome would occur after the infection and
encryption stage with the outcome need for post-incident support. All participants work
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with either customer support or their peer-network for pre-planning or post-incident
support. Participant P1 and participant P3 rely on vendor-supplied customer support for
pre-planning and post-incident support. Participant P1 relies on support from the antivirus
vendor noting, “we would probably contact the virus people; we don’t have a tech guy.”
Participant P3 stated, “[they] would call for customer support.” Participant P2, participant
P4, and participant P5 were more confident in reaching out through their peer-network to
find support based on a peer recommendation either during pre-planning or post-incident.
Participant P2 stated,
Probably like many would, I would have to hire it out, I would have to get with
one of our people that help us and assist us with all of that. I would just let them
walk us through it or get us pointed in the right direction.
Participant P4 stated, “I would reach out to one of my friends and say – hey this popped
up what do I need to do?” Participant P5 stated, “[they] have a go to person and they can
usually get some information from them.” All participants indicated that they relied upon
support structures, as evident in the initial preparation phase against a potential threat
such as ransomware and the strategy to recover post-incident.
All five participants were prepared to address ransomware through their preferred
method of support before and after a potential ransomware incident. Brody et al. (2018)
suggested companies either outsource their information security or implement a dedicated
information security department to manage cybersecurity and proactively prevent harm
against the growing threat of malware. It may be challenging for some small business
leaders to justify the expense of implementing a dedicated information security
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department to address information security concerns. These small business leaders
outsourced their information security needs, involved their peer network, or worked
directly with a security provider. Implementing a dedicated department for information
security was unnecessary for these small business leaders.
Theme 3: Cybersecurity Awareness
Cybersecurity awareness stems from a user-centric view of cybersecurity strategy,
involving multiple pathways of learning and information gathering. Small business
leaders are self-taught, reach out and ask questions from those in their peer network, and
rely on antivirus vendors to provide educational information. Cybersecurity strategies
that do not include user training fail to address behavioral-based errors that lead to
successful ransomware attacks (Nobles, 2018). These self-taught small business leaders
were knowledgeable in their strategies to address ransomware. The participants were
comfortable reaching out to those in their peer network for guidance and education before
an incident or in the event of an infection as a post-incident reactionary response.
Participant P1, participant P3, and participant P5 take advantage of antivirus vendor
supplied educational information. The vendor of participant P1 offered a service named
“security awareness training” and sent out regular communication via email that
reinforces knowledge of the threat of ransomware. Participant P3 and participant P5 have
access to what was listed as “free cyber security training” from their chosen vendor and
received monthly email newsletters that include the latest information and trends related
to ransomware infection. Participant P2 and participant P4 thought that simplified
instruction was best and expressed interest in learning more about cybersecurity. All
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participants were aware of the threats posed by informal cyber activities such as reckless
cyber behavior in opening emails from unknown senders, and visiting unfamiliar
websites, and were inclined to follow advice from trusted sources rather than pursuing
formal education in cybersecurity training.
Participants understood the importance of using caution when operating their
information systems and staying up to date. Participant P2 stated, “as simple as this
sounds, we try to be careful of what files or [junk mail] that we open [through email]”
and participant P5 stated, “[they] try to stay up to date with what is going on and that
[they] receive regular updates and keep [their] computers updated as often as possible.”
Participant P1 stated, “[they] stay informed [of the latest protection against ransomware]
by reading [about the topic] and take [appropriate] action and uses the latest operating
systems to stay up to date [with the latest trends].” Proactively using caution with
opening files and keeping information systems software updated provided these small
business leaders with one strategy to effectively address ransomware. An instinctive
approach appeared to be effective; however, a proactive approach based on cybersecurity
awareness of staying informed and up to date and end-user education was also evident.
Participant P2 and participant P4 used their knowledge to effectively address
ransomware. Participant P2 stated, “shoots from the hip” as one way to describe how they
respond to threats such as ransomware. Participant P4 lacked confidence in knowledge
and understanding of outdated software to protect their information systems from
ransomware. Participant P4 reacted by switching to a perceived more secure platform to
conduct daily business while limiting use on the system viewed as more vulnerable to
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threats. Participant P4 stated, “I don’t do as much work on the [older system] anymore as
I used to, I have got a [newer system] and use it because I think it is safer and use it
more.” Cybersecurity awareness culminates in a user-centric view of small business
leader strategy in responding to the threat posed to their information systems from
ransomware.
Findings Related to Routine Activity Theory
Findings from the data analysis revealed adherence to routine activity theory as all
participants were adamant on using antivirus as part of their ransomware strategy for
effectively addressing ransomware. Antivirus as a ransomware strategy indicates
participants use antivirus as a tool to provide adequate protection or guardianship over
their information systems. A lack of adequate protection or guardianship allows a
ransomware offender to compromise the target information system. While antivirus may
provide adequate protection or guardianship over the target information system other
factors such as support structure and cybersecurity awareness also influence adequate
guardianship.
All participants used, “antivirus” as a ransomware strategy, had support structures
in place ranging from formal to informal, and had a user-centric view of cybersecurity.
Based on the findings from the small business leaders, it was possible to protect small
business information systems against ransomware with effective strategies and support
structures. I selected routine activity as the conceptual framework for my study.
Referencing Jansen and Leukfeldt’s (2016) recommendation, I focused on guardianship
as a way to explain effective strategies to address a single threat of ransomware to small
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business information systems. Bergmann et al. (2018) used a routine activity approach
and recommended studying cybercrime offenses separately to gain a rich understanding
of how potential victim risk factors and protective strategies influence outcomes.
Through the lens of effective guardianship, the role of antivirus in ransomware strategy
was significant with unanimous agreement between participant responses. The
connection between the emergent themes and routine activity theory construct
guardianship was apparent.
Other factors discovered during data collection may influence the effectiveness of
an aspect of the conceptual framework, adequate guardianship. These other factors as
identified during the data collection process as emergent themes included (a) ransomware
strategy, (b) support structure, and (c) cybersecurity awareness. A lack of adequate
guardianship may result in victimization and reinforces the need for protection in the
cyber realm (Choi, Cho, & Lee, 2019; Choi, Earl, Lee, & Cho, 2019; Vakhitova, AlstonKnox, Reynald, Townsley, & Webster, 2019). Proactive protection may support adequate
guardianship, while, reactive protection in the form of a support structure and
rudimentary knowledge and understanding may also contribute to adequate guardianship.
Combining proactive and reactive security measures is effective in combating cybercrime
(Donegan, 2019; Ogunlana, 2019). Having an adequate support arrangement with either a
peer network or vendor-supplied support prior to a ransomware attack may support
adequate guardianship. Cybersecurity awareness includes educating oneself against the
threat of ransomware and how best to protect target information systems from infection.
While Whitty (2019) indicated the act of being cautious because of an awareness of a
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cybersecurity threat is not enough to prevent victimization, Williams, Levi, Burnap, and
Gundur, (2019) found repeated exposure to information on how to protect oneself online
decreased victimization risk. Cybersecurity awareness supports adequate guardianship.
Data and network security includes maintaining adequate backups and protecting the
network (Thomas & Galligher, 2018). Data and network security supports adequate
guardianship, while, failing to properly keep adequate backups of data or securing the
network with firewalls contribute to a lack of adequate guardianship. These contributing
factors were evidence of the strategic value the respondents placed on their joint
application to achieve guardianship to prevent a compromised target by ransomware.
Guardianship emerged as a critical factor in technology and routine activity
theory studies in preventing victimization. Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) and Ilievski
(2016) both discussed the importance of guardianship as technological protection such as
antivirus in their research involving routine activity theory. Routine activity theory
provides constructs of guardianship, motivated offender, and victim. The emergent
themes from this study aligned with guardianship. Figure 2 depicts specific routine
activity theory studies from the literature review. The intersecting studies in Figure 2
reinforce the value of guardianship in a cyber context.
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Figure 2. Intersection of cyber and guardian in routine activity studies.
Figure 2 depicts the studies, highlighted in white, discussed in the literature
review, that contain the routine activity theory conceptual construct guardianship within
the context of the cyber realm. This study on effective strategies small business leaders
used to address ransomware might fit within the same categorization of the studies
highlighted in white. Categorization justification is based on findings linking cyber
guardianship and the emergent themes. Ransomware strategy, support structure, and
cybersecurity awareness fit within the context of routine activity theory guardianship.
Findings from this study echo the importance of the guardianship conceptual construct of
routine activity theory and may have real-world applications that contribute to
professional practice.
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Application to Professional Practice
The findings of this study are relevant to improve strategies small business leaders
use to address ransomware before victimization occurs. Small business leaders can use
the results from this study to confirm if implemented strategies in their organization fall
short, match, or exceed what other leaders of small businesses are doing in their
organizations to address security against ransomware. Organizations whose leaders fail to
measure and address their internal cybersecurity posture create an opportunity for
victimization to occur (Williams et al., 2019). The growing threat of ransomware to small
business information systems is capable of denying access to information system
resources required for daily business operations and specific strategies exist to mitigate
the threat.
Small business leaders can adapt their strategies to address ransomware by
examining their management approach of data and the network, support structure, and
cybersecurity awareness. Reducing the likelihood of victimization requires going beyond
the act of examining cybersecurity strategies with implementation (Whitty, 2019). Based
on the findings of the study, small business leaders may consider evaluating how they are
backing up critical information system assets. Increasing the retention period may
improve the chances of recovery in case of a successful ransomware attack (Thomas &
Galligher, 2018). Users should carefully scrutinize email messages before opening, keep
operating systems updated (Bergmann et al., 2018), and consider incorporating a strategy
to keep important small business data backed up (Thomas & Galligher, 2018). The small
business leaders of this study had adequate support structures, access to trusted sources of
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information on cybersecurity, and were confident in their ability to address the evolving
threat of ransomware.
Implications for Social Change
One positive implication for social change is providing research results that may
help mitigate the existing threat of motivated offenders who commit cybercrimes,
specifically ransomware. Some of the prerequisites of routine activity theory are satisfied
when studying cybercrime and users on the Internet, as cybercriminals are prevalent on
the Internet and Internet users fulfill the role of suitable targets (Bergmann et al., 2018).
Individuals accountable for securing information systems similar to what is in use at a
small business may use the research results to help identify effective strategies used to
mitigate the specific threat of ransomware.
Mitigating the threat of ransomware may benefit communities and other
organizations. Communities and other organizations may benefit when small business
leaders ensure continuity of operations and maintain customer expectations. Small
business leaders might use the study results to implement strategies to address
ransomware and prevent data loss, prevent delays, and mitigate damage arising from a
successful ransomware attack.
Small business leaders may use study results to increase awareness and improve
the security culture of their local organization and beyond. Increasing awareness of
strategies to effectively address ransomware may help promote security at a societal
level. Society as a whole may benefit as small business leaders might reach beyond their
local peer network and influence others who may be responsible for implementing
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strategies to address ransomware, reduce uncertainty, and promote a healthy
cybersecurity culture beyond the local communities they serve.
Recommendations for Action
The recommendations I am providing are based on the research findings and
could possibly serve as a starting point for future publications targeted to small business
leaders responsible for strategies to address ransomware in their organization. Based on
the research findings, I would recommend installing adequate antivirus protection,
keeping software updated, using caution when opening files, and incorporating a data
backup strategy to safeguard important small business information system files.
Additionally, small business leaders having a peer-network with access to technical
expert contacts or who use paid customer support channels were more confident in their
strategy to address ransomware.
I plan to disseminate the results of this study publicly as a keynote speaker at a
Nutanix .NEXT conference or as a Cisco Live! panelist. The general content and specific
findings from this study may be a useful resource for future work and career endeavors. I
will use the research findings to justify solicited advice I might give during client
discussions, while professionally consulting, and through my chain of command.
Recommendations for Further Research
One limitation of the findings is ransomware is an evolving threat, and successful
strategies for addressing ransomware may continue to change. Known best practices may
need adjustment to counter the evolving threat of ransomware. Future researchers may
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need to consider ransomware evolution and how threat vectors may change over time to
gauge strategy effectiveness to address ransomware.
Future researchers may consider expanding the sample size, studying a different
population, or modifying the research design. The sample size for this study was
sufficient to reach saturation; however, future researchers may include a larger sample to
verify results. Future researchers may focus on a specific sector of small business that
may be known as more of a target for ransomware attacks, such as the financial or health
sector. A quantitative or mixed-method design might allow future researchers to add to
the discussion by incorporating additional data points and broadening the scope of
inquiry. Additionally, future researchers might choose to investigate the inverse of this
study and evaluate successful ransomware infections to understand failure and recovery.
Reflections
I began my scholarly journey as a degree-seeking student in March of 2008. I
started by taking online classes, and as an information technology expert, the online
environment was a natural fit for my existing skillsets. The culmination of effort,
dedication, and focus on achieving high academic goals and following in the footsteps of
giants has been a gratifying experience. I am better prepared to take on the challenges of
working in a competitive environment where I can use what I have learned to improve
performance and discover new information. The doctor of business administration
process has taught me how to investigate the world using new tools and techniques to
create meaningful change, sustainability, and positively influence those around me.
Ultimately, it is my goal to share information and be the change in the world I want to

91
see. Sharing knowledge and improving the local community is one way to improve the
world around me. I will continue to set a positive example by pursuing excellence and
leading by example through servant leadership. Achieving the high academic standards of
a doctorate is a challenging and difficult journey, but so are the rewards for those with the
perseverance, determination, and tenacity to undertake and complete the challenge.
Conclusion
The findings of this multiple case study contain effective strategies to address
ransomware, revealed the multifaceted strategy of support structures, and contains
evidence of the cybersecurity awareness required to effectively address the threat of
ransomware from the perspective of a small business leader. Additionally, the findings
contribute to the literature on effective strategies small business leaders use to address
ransomware in the context of routine activity theory. The small business leaders
interviewed during this study were aware of the importance of protecting their
information systems and implemented formal and instinctive strategies. The small
business leaders who were successfully addressing ransomware: (a) relied on antivirus
and firewalls to protect their data and network, (b) kept their information systems
updated, (c) scrutinized files before opening, (d) had a support structure for assistance in
the event of an adverse event affecting their information systems, and (e) used their
cybersecurity awareness of threats as a strategy to effectively address ransomware.
Some of the small business leaders were unimpressed with free software
purporting to protect their information systems and instead preferred to pay for antivirus
protection from reputable vendors. The small business leaders were cognizant of the
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threats posed by fraudulent emails and were cautious about opening suspicious email
attachments. The small business leaders who lacked confidence in the ability of their
existing information systems switched to newer systems as alternatives they perceived as
superior to conduct daily business operations.
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Appendix: Interview Protocol
Participant Information:
Date: __________________
Participant Identifier: ____________________________
Introduction:
1. I will introduce myself to the participant and ensure I have a signed informed
consent from the participant.
2. I will begin the interview with: Thank you for participating in this interview to
explore effective strategies small business leaders use to address ransomware. I
will audio record the interview for transcription purposes and take notes as the
interview progresses. I will keep your identity and responses confidential, you can
skip any of the interview questions, or stop the interview at any time. Do you
have any questions for me before we start?
3. I will begin the audio recording now.
4. I will stay cognizant of any non-verbal cues, ask follow-up probing questions
when appropriate, and conduct member checking during and post-interview.
Interview Questions
1. What strategies do you use to protect your information systems from
ransomware?
2. How did you assess the effectiveness of your strategies for protecting your
information systems from ransomware?
3. What were the key barriers to implementing the strategies for protecting your
company from ransomware?
4. How did you address the key barriers to implementing the strategies for
improving your protection against ransomware?
5. What other information could you add that might be applicable to the strategies
that small business owners use to protect their information systems from
ransomware?
Conclusion:
I will conclude the interview by thanking the participant for their participation and
arrange for a convenient time for me to contact them to conduct a member
checking interview.
Member Checking:
1. I will contact the participant by telephone and confirm if the participant agrees
with the meanings I derived from the interview responses.
2. I will repeat the process of member checking until we agree with the meanings I
derive from their responses.

